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The Battle of the Rosebud
by
Albert Winkler
The Battle of the Rosebud, which took place on 17 June 1876, was the largest single
engagement between the United States cavalry and Indian forces in the entire history of the
American West. It was a fierce encounter that lasted about six hours and involved all together
several thousand cavalrymen and Indian warriors . The outcome of the contest was highly
significant because it turned back a major invasion of Indian territories and freed many warriors to
engage another invading force under the command of George Armstrong Custer. This led to the
destruction of Custer' s command at the Battle of the Little Bighorn by a much superior enemy on
25 June 1876. One of the participants in the Rosebud encounter, Lieutenant Charles Morton,
stated, with perhaps some exaggeration relating to the numbers of Indians engaged, that the
conflict "was probably the greatest Indian battle in our history-some 1400 soldiers and friendly
Indians against some 5000 hostiles." ' Because Custer' s defeat took place only eight days after
the Battle of the Rosebud, the earlier engagement has been largely overlooked and has not been
given the attention it deserves.2
Background to the War
The Battle of the Rosebud was a major engagement of the Great Sioux War of 1876-7,
which was caused by the dishonest and often callous policies of he United States government
toward the native peoples of North America. In 1868, Red Cloud of the Oglala Sioux (also
known as the Oglala Lakota) negotiated the Treaty of Fort Laramie with the United States. The
treaty ended two years of war between the Sioux and the white Americans and was designed to
assure peaceful relations between the two adversaries. The agreement specified that many lands
in the modern states of Nebraska, Wyoming, Montana, and South Dakota would remain in the
hands of the indigenous peoples. This included the Black Hills of South Dakota, which were the
most sacred lands of the all the Sioux groups and were considered to be the center of their
universe. Not only did all military posts in these areas have to be abandoned, but the treaty
clearly stated that no unauthorized white person "shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon,
or reside in the territory." This issue was so important that it was repeated again in the document,
"It also stipulates and agrees that no white person or persons shall be permitted to settle upon or
occupy any portion of [the lands or] to pass through [them]." 3
The United States had little interest in keeping the treaty for long, and the federal
government soon broke the agreement. A glaring example of a treaty violation came in 1874
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when George Armstrong Custer took the Seventh Cavalry into the area on the Black Hills
Expedition. The reasons for the incursion seemed to be innocent because Custer' s men were
supposedly on Sioux lands to explore, to survey a new route near Fort Laramie, and to find a
good site for a fort . But the expedition was illegal because it violated the treaty agreements
stipulating that no unauthorized entry into Sioux lands was allowed. Also, the search for a
location of a fort would be a further breach of the agreement if such a post was established.
Technically speaking, the undertaking was a military invasion and an act of war. Many civilians
who accompanied the expedition came looking for gold as well . When these prospectors found
gold, the news spread rapidly and set off a gold rush in which many white men rushed into the
sacred Black Hills.4
As many white prospectors rushed into Sioux lands, and the federal government made
feeble if any efforts to restrain them, the Treaty of Fort Laramie was becoming a dead letter. War
was likely to ensue, and the United States government tried diplomatic initiatives to stave off
hostilities. The government brought a delegation of prominent Sioux, including Red Cloud and
Spotted Tail, to Washington, DC, in late spring 1875 to negotiate with them. The bureaucrats in
Washington brought the leaders by train giving them the opportunity to see the vastness of the
country and to be impressed with the size of the white population and their extensive resources.
The Sioux met with President Ulysses S. Grant, the "Great White Father," on 26 May, and "the
old general lost no time in laying down the law of might makes right. " Grant told the chiefs that
the white people outnumbered them by 200 to 1, and the disparity in numbers would only
continue to grow. The Sioux' s condition was hopeless. They could not restrain their adversaries,
and the native peoples would have to leave their lands and be resettled elsewhere.5
Many officials of the government thought that no further concessions should be made to
the Sioux and that the protection of the white people was the most important consideration.
General George Crook, who later led the United States forces at the Battle of the Rosebud,
believed that the federal forces should be used to support the settlers and miners who were
illegally invading Sioux lands. He said that they should be under the nation' s protection.6
On the next day, the delegation met with Columbus Delano, the Secretary of the Interior,
and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Edwin P . Smith, who continued the effort of
intimidation. Delano said that the Sioux were receiving funds from the government, and he told
the chiefs, "Now if you don ' t do what's right, Congress will refuse to give you any more aid. " 7
The government offered them only $25,000 for their lands, and they would have to move to the
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Indian Territory in what is now Oklahoma. This amount of money was a tiny sum for the tens of
thousands of square miles the Sioux would have to surrender, and Spotted Tail treated this cheap
bribe with contempt. He said he still wanted to abide by the Treaty of Fort Laramie, but the white
men did not. The chief clearly wanted to stay on the lands that belonged to him and his people,
and he commented wryly, "If it [the other land] is such a good country, you ought to send the
white men now in our country there, and leave us alone." 8 The wrangling over an agreement to
steal land from the Sioux went on for weeks but failed to reach the desired goals of the
government, and no new treaty was negotiated. The chiefs left on 4 July.
The federal government made another attempt to negotiate a favorable settlement. Special
commissioners, which included Commissioner Smith and United States Senator William B.
Allison, met the Sioux at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, on 20 Sept. 1875. Many of the native people
refused to negotiate in the post fearing that they would be forced to make a treaty under duress,
so they finally met at White River, eight miles away. The meeting included a huge number of
Sioux and other native peoples. Anson Mills, a cavalry officer who was at the conference,
estimated that 20,000 Indians were present. He thought the natives at the meeting represented
"probably 40,000 to 45 ,000 [people] of various tribes." Perhaps three quarters of the adult males
of these peoples were at the conference. 9 No doubt, thousands of these men were potential
warnors.
Senator Allison opened the remarks, and he began to make a speech about the surrender
of the Sioux lands. The federal government offered the Indians $6 million for their lands, but the
Native peoples were long used to the many lies told to them by the white men. Red Cloud was in
no mood to negotiate with government officials he could not trust, and he made impossible
demands. He required that the United States give clothing and food to the Sioux for seventy
generations and pay then the astronomical sum of $600 million. 10
The negotiations continued for two weeks with heated debates among the various Sioux
groups that led to some fights among them. It was expected that Red Cloud and Spotted Tail
would support giving up the areas if the price was right, but the entire idea of surrendering sacred
lands infuriated many of the warriors. Even before Red Cloud spoke, Little Big Man "rode
between the commission and the seated Indian chiefs" on his horse. He wore war headgear, and
he had two revolvers attached to a cord around his waist. He was obviously agitated, and he
threatened, "I will kill the first Indian chief who speaks favorably to the selling of the Black Hills."
Anson Mills estimated that "at least half the men warriors pressed about us threatening to kill
some member of the commission." Fearing for their lives, the members of the delegation
retreated back to the fort . Clearly, there was no chance for a negotiated settlement at that point,

8

Spotted Tail as cited in the Diaries of John Hunton, p. 69.

9

Anson Mills, My Story, (Washington, DC : Adams, 1918), p. 167.

10

Charles M . Robinson, A Good Year to Die: the Story of the Great Sioux War (New
York : Random House, 1995), pp. 39-40.

4
and Mills believed war would break out in the spring. 11
Others agreed with this sad assessment of the situation, and the government set in motion
plans that led to hostilities. On 3 Nov. 1875, President Grant met in Washington, DC, with his
important military and civilian leaders who were responsible for controlling Indians in the West.
These men agreed that the miners must have access to the Black Hills, and the native peoples
would have to leave, by the use of military force if necessary. This meant that the Indians had to
leave the disputed lands and, in effect, surrender them to the government without compensation.
The Department of the Interior sent instructions to its Indian agents on 6 Dec. 18 75 to tell all the
Sioux, and other tribes associated with agencies in the Nebraska and Dakota areas, to report to
their reservations by 31 Jan . 1876. If the Indians failed to do so, they would be considered
hostile, which meant they were subject to military action that would force them to go to the
agencies .12
These orders were totally impractical. Many of the Indian agents did not receive the
letters until the end of December, and, frequently, the information was not forwarded to the
Indians until days or weeks later. Few of the natives were able to come to the agencies within the
time limit because of severe winter weather, and the government had insufficient resources to feed
them even if they arrived on time. Out of necessity, many of the hungry Indians soon left the
posts in search of food . The fact that the Indians either could not come to the posts, or were
forced to suffer when they arrived, meant that they could not meet the orders that restricted them
to the agencies.13 In effect, this call for the native peoples to come to the posts was a cruel trick
and a virtual declaration of war against them .
Ben Arnold, who fought in the war as a scout and was a keen observer, assessed the
situation well . He realized that the federal government tried to justify its actions of taking the
land by going to war, and he stated that "the smoke of battle has screened many a high-handed
territory seizure." In the face of the invasion, the "fighting the Indians did was in self-defense."
He added succinctly, "Of all the wars in which the United States has been engaged, the least
justification is found in the Sioux War of 1876. The Interior Department can never wash its hands
of this crime." 14 The largest Indian war in the history of the American West, which cost many
hundreds of lives, was set in motion because the government stole the land that had been granted
to the Sioux forever.
General Philip Sheridan was in command over the Department of the Missouri, and was,
therefore, responsible for planning the upcoming campaign. Short in stature "Little Phil," who
was 5 feet 5 inches tall, was known as a brutal commander during the American Civil War
especially when he oversaw the destruction of the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia in 1864. He
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soon brought his callous policies of dealing with his enemies to the West. Sheridan probably
popularized the most cruel of all statements regarding the American Indians when he was
speaking with Toch-a-way (Turtle Dove) of the Comanches in 1869. According to Captain
Charles Nordstrom, who was an eyewitness, the chief assured the General of his peaceful
intentions. He struck himself on the chest and stated, "Me, Toch-a-way; me good Injun." In an
observation that set the whites at the scene roaring with laughter, Sheridan responded, "The only
good Indians I ever saw were dead ." 15 This comment was soon shortened to "The only good
Indian is a dead Indian." Sheridan later denied making the remark, but these words clearly
represented his well-known hatred for native peoples and his desire to see them treated harshly.16
No doubt, this callous sentiment had long been held by many whites, and the phrase "a good
Indian," meant a dead Native American.
Phil Sheridan believed that the army should strike the Indians as soon as possible in the
harsh winter conditions when they would be more vulnerable to attacks because they could only
move with difficulty in the challenging weather. He chose General George Crook to lead part of
the operation to subdue the Sioux.17 Crook has often been considered the most experienced and
most effective Indian fighter in the history of the American West, but his performance was
frequently uneven. Sometimes, he showed great competency and at other times inexplicable
foolishness, frequently on the same campaign. Sheridan and Crook had known each other since
childhood and had roomed together at the US Military Academy at West Point. The two men' s
early friendship degenerated into hatred and jealousy by 1876 largely because Crook was envious
of Sheridan' s greater success. Crook, at more than 6 feet tall, was a much more domineering
figure than "Little Phil," and he often made fun of the shorter man' s appearance and denigrated
his leadership. While Sheridan returned the ill will, he still thought Crook an able commander and
gave him important assignments.18
The Indians who left the reservations had little choice but to go to the only place in the
West where they could find large herds of buffalo (North American Bison) because the animal
was their main source of food . The buffalo had recently roamed the Great Plains in America in
their tens of millions, but hunters converged on the animals in the 18 70s and slaughtered them in
huge numbers.19 The federal authorities realized that the destruction of the bison would solve the
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Indian problem, and government officials often gave hunters free ammunition for their task. In
1875 Sheridan praised the hunters, "These men have done in the last two years, and will do more
in the next year, to settle the vexed Indian question than the entire regular army has done in the
last thirty years .... Send them powder and lead, if you will; but for the sake of a lasting peace let
them kill, skin, and sell until the buffaloes are exterminated." 20 Once these animals were gone,
the Indians had little choice but live on the meager food supplies the government would give
them. By 1876, there were only a few thousand buffalo left, and most of these were found in the
area near the borders of the modem states of Wyoming, Montana, and North and South Dakota.
This was the last year when the Indians could hope to live in their native environment and enjoy
their culture because the bison would soon be gone.21
On 7 Feb . 1876, General Sheridan received orders to move against the Sioux who were
not on the reservations. Sheridan planned a three-pronged attack on these areas to catch the
Indians in a vice and to crush them between various columns of soldiers. Alfred Terry, John
Gibbon, and George Crook led the expeditions. The eastern column under General Alfred Terry,
which included the Seventh Cavalry led by George Armstrong Custer, was ordered to leave Fort
Abraham Lincoln in North Dakota and march west. But Terry stated he could not get Custer' s
unit ready to march before spring, and severe weather also delayed his departure until May.
Sheridan ordered Colonel John Gibbon to advance from Fort Ellis in the western areas of modem
Montana in an easterly direction, and the column left on l 7 March. The men marched through
deep snow down the Yellowstone River and established a post at the mouth of the Bighorn River,
but the advance had little impact on the military situation because the soldiers found no Indians.
Only the southern column under General George Crook, who took the field in March, located an
Indian village.22
The Big Horn Expedition
General Crook' s troops left Fort Fetterman on 1 March 1876 and marched north. Crook
planned to reach the Big Hom River and attack any Indians he might encounter. His command
included ten companies of cavalry and two of infantry, which numbered all together about nine
hundred men. The General asked the opinion of his scouts on the location of the Indians, and
Frank Grouard told him that a Sioux encampment was most likely to be found on the Powder
River. Crook asked the guide what made him so certain. Grouard stated, "from my knowledge
of the Indians and their mode of living in the winter time. I knew where they ranged in the winter
time." The next morning the General sent Grouard and other scouts to reconnoiter the trail to the
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Tongue River, a short distance from the Powder River, to see if any Indian camps were there.23
Shortly after the expedition left Fort Fetterman Robert E. Strahorn, a newspaper man who
accompanied the troops, stated, " Some of our half-breed scouts say that Crazy Horse .. . is only
about seventy miles ahead of us with a large number of warriors." This war chief was famous for
advocating resisting the incursions of the whites onto Indian lands, and he had "rode stark naked
and armed to the teeth through the grounds of the peace commission last summer and lifted up his
voice for war." 24 Clearly, this man and his village were very tempting targets, and the desire to
attack them inspired the army to press forward even in the harshest conditions and in the face
of harassment from the enemy.
The General clearly believed that winter campaigns gave advantages to the soldiers. When
the snows were deep, the Indian adversaries were less mobile meaning they could not easily flee,
and they could more often be attacked in their villages. The Indian ponies were smaller animals
than the larger cavalry mounts and walked through deep snow with greater difficulty. While the
army brought oats for its animals to eat on campaigns, the ponies had to use their hooves to
scrape away enough snow to eat some grass. This made the Indian' s horses weak in the winter
time, which meant they could not be used in vigorous campaigns. These weakened ponies
removed the Indians' biggest advantage, their ability to run and to maneuver. When the cavalry
found and attacked an Indian village in the winter time, the soldiers had a distinct advantage in
combat because they had much better fire discipline and coordination than did their adversaries.
As Crook admitted, "The worse it [the weather] gets the better; always hunt Indians in bad
weather. " 25
The Indians cleverly realized that attacking and seizing the army' s food supply was a good
means to slow its advance. The column brought a herd of cattle with it to be slaughtered for
food, and a few warriors struck the bovines early in the campaign. On 2 March, a guard was
watching the heard of cattle at night when one of the troopers, Jim Wright, saw "two or three
Indians creeping toward him through the sagebrush." Several shots were fired and the warriors
gave out "a number of unearthly yells." Even though the entire command was ordered to
assemble for battle, the Indians successfully took fifty cattle, and they left Jim Wright mortally
wounded . He had been shot through the lungs.26
In the evening of 5 March, the Indians struck again. A group of warriors tried to sneak to
the soldier' s camp in an unsuccessful attempt to stampede the horses. When the Indians were
spotted, the,troopers opened fire, and both sides exchanged shots for nearly an hour. Initially, the
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situation appeared to be dangerous for the soldiers because they were standing near their camp
fires when the first shots rang out, and they were illuminated by the flames . But the men soon ran
away from the light and kept up a high rate of fire . The soldiers had difficulty seeing their targets
in the darkness, and "the way of returning their [the Indians' ] fire was to watch the flashes of their
guns and send a bullet after the flash." The warriors seemed to fire accurately despite the
darkness, and "bullets [were] whizzing about our heads and sometimes lower, in a manner that
was a little more interesting than agreeable, especially to those of us who had never been under
fire until then." Despite this relatively accurate fire, only one trooper, Corporal Slavey, was
wounded when a bullet went through his cheek.27
Lieutenant John Bourke did not fear these petty engagements, and he thought these
skirmishes benefitted the army' s readiness. Most of the men were new recruits and had little
military expertise because "many of them [were] as yet imperfectly drilled ." Bourke believed that,
"these little night attacks were excellent things," and they turned "the raw recruit into a veteran"
very rapidly. This campaign was making the troopers into able and disciplined soldiers. 28
The severe weather of late winter made the campaign very challenging. The temperatures
were cold, and the men suffered "without tents or adequate bedding." 29 The troopers were forced
to sleep as best they could. Some men threw blankets over trees to create a crude shelter while
others made beds out of twigs and grass. General Crook and Col. Thaddeus H. Stanton were
even more resourceful when they used an abandoned beaver lodge as a place to sleep. Snow
started falling on the morning of 8 March, and it continued all day. The heavy snowfall put out
camp fires and kept the cooks from fixing a hot meal for the soldiers that morning. The men had
no recourse but to eat "frozen bacon, frozen beans and frozen coffee." The ice was so thick on
the nearby stream that the men had to hack through eighteen inches of ice to find the water. 30
A storm continued to hit the soldiers on 9 March, and it snowed the entire day with "the
bitter North wind blowing in our faces." That afternoon a thermometer went to minus 6 degrees
Fahrenheit. The severe weather continued on 10 March, and, once again, it snowed all day. The
clouds parted that night and temperatures fell dramatically. When the men awoke on 11 March
the thermometer registered minus 22 degrees Fahrenheit. This was the lowest the mercury in the
instrument could measure, and the soldiers believed that the actual temperature was as low as
minus 39 degrees or perhaps between 40 and 50 degrees below zero Fahrenheit. Mercifully, the
wind stopped that day, and the wind chill factor did not increase the men ' s misery.3 1
The men were forced to chop off pieces of bacon with axes, and the few loaves of soft
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bread that were still in the camp "were frozen solid as so many rocks. " While the men
remarkably, "complained but little," a few of them commented on their condition. Many of the
men in the army were immigrants from foreign countries, and Americans often found their accents
and antics amusing, especially those of the Irish and Germans. Pat, the Irishman, and Hans, the
German, tried to stay warm by sleeping under the same blanket. In his misery, Pat observed, "It ' s
damned cold, ain't it?" Hans responded, "Ve has peen damt fools, ain 't we?" He was probably
referring to their decision to join the army. Hans had written on his knapsack at the beginning of
the campaign, "Big Horn [River] or Hell." After facing the bitter cold, he scratched out those
words and wrote, "Hell Froze Over! " 32
The scouts pressed forward trying to locate an Indian camp. Frank Grouard finally found
the tracks of two warriors. He caught up with them, and he watched their progress for hours.
From their activities, he believed there was an Indian village within striking distance of the army.
He convinced General Crook that the camp could be surprised by a forced march through the
night. The General took him at his word, and he ordered his second-in-command, Colonel Joseph
J. Reynolds, to take six companies of cavalry to travel rapidly overnight and to attack the
position. The detachment was 370 strong. Perhaps a dozen or more scouts were with them,
meaning that the entire command was nearly 400 men. For maximum flexibility on the operation,
these forces were divided into three battalions of two companies each. 33
Crook stayed with the remaining four companies of cavalry and two of infantry to protect
the slower baggage train. He also remained in camp at Otter Creek all night meaning that the two
columns would be widely separated. 34 Logically, the General should have followed Reynolds as
rapidly as possible to be in a position to offer support if it became necessary. However, the
General chose to advance to the Powder River by another route planning to rendezvous with
Reynolds at the river after the Colonel ' s detachment had the opportunity to strike at the Indian
encampment. Dividing forces in the face of an enemy was a dangerous tactic, and the fact that
Crook was far away from Reynolds meant that the Colonel lacked the manpower he needed to
accomplish his assigned tasks. Late in the afternoon of 16 March, the men in Reynolds'
detachment took enough rations for two days and left the remainder of the command.35
Grouard, who had accompanied Reynolds, admitted "that the night was the coldest one I ever
experienced in the northern country." 36 The temperature was very low, and a "wind blowing
keenly all the time" made the wind chill even more severe. The troopers rode until about 3 AM
when they finally came to a halt. The men took their places in line in a dry ravine "enduring great
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suffering from the intense frigidity of the atmosphere." Some of the soldiers appeared to be on
the brink of dying from the cold as Lt. Bourke admitted, "Men in this ravine became drowsy from
excessive cold : officers had to kick and shake them to keep them awake and save them from
freezing to death." 37 Strahorn, a newspaperman, accompanied the expedition, and he found the
cold "almost unbearable." Some of the men stated that they would sleep "just for a minute, you
know," but such a slumber was very dangerous. When their concerned friends shook them
awake, these men would " make all sorts of excuses to be allowed to enter that sleep which, if
undisturbed, would have known no waking." 38
The Battle of Powder River
Grouard scouted ahead and reported that a large village was close by, and the soldiers
pushed forward to strike it before the Indians knew they were coming. As they approached the
camp, the troopers saw the young warriors walking around the Indian lodges in the valley below
them. Horses and mules grazed on the banks of the Powder River nearby. Even though the sun
was already up, Reynolds had time to get his men in order for battle because the Indians had not
yet detected them.
The Colonel ordered his units to attack the enemy position from different directions.
Company I, under control of Captain Henry Noyes, would advance mounted and strike the herd
oflndian ponies that were grazing nearby. At the same time, Company K, under the command of
Captain James Egan, was ordered to charge directly into the encampment on horseback firing
their pistols as they struck. Reynolds ordered two other companies under Captain Alexander
Moore to dismount, advance on foot, and take up a position as close to the village as possible and
"hold themselves in readiness to promptly and vigorously follow up the charge." 39 Reynolds
explained his plan to Lieutenant Bourke. "I am sending Noyes' Battalion to charge the village,
because we can give them [the Indians] Egan' s pistols. " The commander continued, "when they
start [to run] from the village Moore will catch them from the top of the ridge [with his rifles]. " 40
Many of the soldiers believed, and continued to believe for many years, that they were
striking a Sioux village, and that its warriors were led by Crazy Horse. Actually, it was a
Cheyenne camp under Chief Old Bear, and this tribe had little to do with the disputes between the
U.S . government and the Sioux. The Cheyenne just happened to be in the wrong place at the
wrong time. The cavalry made no effort to identify whom they were attacking, and they cared
little whose village they would soon attempt to destroy. The army knew simply that there was an
Indian village nearby, and that was reason enough to burn it and kill its inhabitants if they could.
There were over 100 lodges in the encampment, which included perhaps 700 people. Among
these were about 250 warriors. When the cavalry struck, the Cheyenne were surprised and badly
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outnumbered, but they soon gave a good account of themselves.41
Lieutenant John Bourke was proud of the skillful deployment of the troops. When
Captain Egan gave the orders for the soldiers to form lines for battle, "the little company of fortyseven men formed a beautiful line in less time than it takes to narrate the movement. " Egan told
his men to keep their horses at a walk until they were spotted by the enemy. They were then "to
charge at a slow trot, ... and upon approaching closely to fire our pistols and storm the village."
Bourke saw that "an Indian boy, herding his ponies, was standing within ten feet of me." The
Lieutenant leveled his revolver at the child perhaps contemplating killing the boy, so he could not
alarm the village of the army' s approach. But Captain Egan intervened and told Bourke, "let him
alone John." The child retained his composure " maintaining silence until we had passed and then
shouting the war-whoop to alarm the village. " 42
Hunters from the Cheyenne village had seen the troopers camped at Otter Creek, and the
warriors rode back to the village as fast as possible. Some of their ponies fell from exhaustion,
and their riders were forced to reach the encampment on foot. Many young men went out that
night to watch for the soldiers including ten young men with specific orders from the council of
old men. The Indians in the village slept securely that night believing that the sentinels would
warn them if the troopers approached, but the young men on lookout failed to see the soldiers in
time to give an adequate warning. That morning an old man went to the top of a hill to pray
when he saw the cavalry. He started shouting, "the soldiers are right here! The soldiers are right
here! " When the army attacked, many of the Indians panicked. "Women screamed. Children
cried for their mothers . Old people tottered and hobbled away to get out of reach of the bullets
singing among the lodges. Braves seized whatever weapons they had and tried to meet the
attack." 43 The battle had begun.
The newspaperman, Robert Strahorn, fought with Company K when it attacked . He
wrote that the men were ordered to draw their revolvers, place their "steeds to the full gallop,
dash into the village with as much force and with as terrific yells as possible, and when once
among the savages, to empty our six-shooters ' where they would do the most good ."' When the
men were less than two hundred yards from the nearest lodge, the order was given, "Charge, my
boys!" The men spurred their horses, and the troopers attacked, "yelling like so many demons."
The Cheyenne ran out of their tepees and scattered as fast as they could . The soldiers "fired right
and left at their retreating forms ." The troopers' mounts seemed to be invigorated by the din of
battle, and "they fairly flew over the ground. " The Indians were only briefly confused, and they
began to resist effectively. " A majority of the Redskins snatched their arms as they ran, dropped
as though shot, behind a log or stump, in the tall grass, or took temporary refuse in the thickets of
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willow and plum [trees]. " The warriors began firing back and inflicting casualties on the
attackers . The cavalrymen were riding gray horses, and the color of the animals made them more
visible to the defenders, so the Indians found them to be good targets. Five of the animals were
wounded, including the horse rode by Captain Egan, and two were killed.44
According to Frank Grouard, one of these horses was killed in a heroic fashion. During
the attack, the hospital steward, Will Bryan, was riding next to Captain Egan. When the men
rode among the lodges, a Indian ran out of one of them and aimed his weapon at the Captain.
Bryan could see that Egan could be killed in an instant, and he ran his horse forward to protect
the Captain. The Indian fired and the bullet went straight into the head of the mount killing it
instantly. Bryan was then on foot, and he attempted to run down the Indian. The soldier ran after
him chasing him past the groups of lodges. Even though the steward was known as a good
runner, he failed to catch the warrior.45 Robert Strahorn gave a less dramatic and a less heroic
account of the incident. He wrote that Bryan saw a young warrior firing revolvers at him from
behind a tree stump. The steward ducked behind his horse' s head to avoid being hit, "and the
poor animal received the bullet in his brain." According to this account, the animal died saving
Bryan not Egan.46
During the charge into the village, a bullet went through a soldier' s cap. The ball just
grazed the man' s head, but he and a couple of other men dashed forward "to wreak their
vengeance on the Redskin who had fired ." When they rushed into a lodge, they were very
surprised to see three or four women armed with revolvers, "in the act of slipping through the
opposite side of the wigwam by way of a hole they had just carved with butcher knives."
Strahorn was clearly impressed with the courage and resourcefulness of his adversaries, and he
admitted, "These Indians may be cowardly, but they have a queer way of showing it. " 47
The Indians "threw themselves behind the brush ... [and] opened upon us in a lively fire ."
The soldiers were still wielding their pistols. They kept pressing forward, and they forced the
warriors to abandon "the first line of trees," and take "refuge farther to the rear. " While
Lieutenant Bourke stated the men had "behaved very gallantly" in the "3 or 4 minutes this little
affair lasted," they had taken casualties. Three men were wounded, including John Droege. One
was shot in the lungs, another had been struck in the elbow, and yet another was hit in the collar
bone. Private George Schneider, "a very brave soldier," was shot through the neck and soon
died . There were also many close misses. Bourke' s "bridle rein was cut in two by a bullet and a
number of men were shot through their clothing." 48
When Wooden Leg ran out of his lodge, he grabbed what weapons he could. He had an
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old muzzle-loading rifle, but he had no bullets for it. He also owned an old six-shooter pistol, but
he had recently loaned it to Star, a cousin, who gave him a bow and some arrows in return.
Wooden Leg shot the arrows at the soldiers, but these antiquated weapons were ineffective.
Fortunately, he got to the horse herd in time to grab an animal, and the warrior tried to return to
the village where he met people trying to escape. "Women were struggling along with packs of
precious belongings. Some were dragging or carrying their children. All were shrieking with
fright. " He put a young girl and a small boy on his mount and brought them to safety, but his
day' s work was not done. "Then I went back to help in the fight. " 49
The Indians kept up a heavy fire by "pouring bullets from behind every convenient cover
in the shape of rocks, trees, thickets, etc." The soldiers had lost the momentum they had used in
the charge on the village, and their pistols had insufficient range to threaten the warriors. The
troopers were ordered to dismount, to give their horses to every fourth man to hold them, and to
continue the battle by the use of their carbines, which were short rifles. The situation became
critical as the Cheyenne occupied more defensible positions than did the cavalry. Captain Moore
was supposed to take an advantageous position overlooking the village that potentially could have
trapped the Indians, but his troopers were detained and the flank of Company K was exposed.
Strahorn feared the warriors "must have thought it an easy matter to annihilate us in a very short
course of events." Captain Egan clearly thought that aggressive action could have kept his
adversaries at a distance and regained the initiative for the cavalry, so he "soon ordered a charge
through the brush on foot." Even though the Indians continued to fight, they were pushed back
by this unexpected advance. During the charge, a small detachment of "half a dozen men" came
down the hill to aid the hard-pressed soldiers. Soon after, Company M and E finally arrived, and
the cavalry was then in complete control of the village.50
Captain Noyes brought up Company I and swung around Egan ' s command on the right to
strike at the Indian horse herd, which his men easily captured. There were about 700 to 800
ponies, which "did not include more than half the number seen by us." But the loss of these
animals was a severe blow to the Indians' ability to fight and to move. The warriors were still on
the high ground outside the village, and they continued to fire at the troopers. Reynolds believed
that he had too few soldiers to drive his adversaries away completely, so he ordered his men to
form a skirmish line to keep the warriors at a distance. He stated, "The Indians fled from the
village and assumed positions behind rocks, trees etc and opened fire upon our line making it
necessary that our position just taken should be strongly held by our troops to prevent the Indians
from recapturing the village." 51
Reynolds then ordered the complete destruction of the village. He was hampered in this
effort because most of his men were deployed in the line of battle, and Reynolds assigned only
Company E under Lieutenant John Johnson with the task. Many of the materials to be destroyed
were works of art. Bourke said that there were buffalo robes and skins of beavers and bears, and
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"many [were] of extra-fine quality." Some of the robes "were wondrously embroidered with
porcupine quills, paint and trimmings." Much of the leather was also "embroidered with beadwork. " The Indians had many belongings. "In each lodge, knives and forks, spoons, tin-cups,
platters, mess-pans, frying-pans, pots and kettles of all kinds, axes, hatchets, hunting knives,
water-kegs, blankets, pillows and every imaginable kind of truck [small miscellaneous items] was
seen in profusion." The soldiers also found tons of venison and dried buffalo meat. The troopers
set the lodges on fire, and the men heard the pop and puff of ammunition and powder exploding
from the flames .52
The lodges did not burn as rapidly as was expected because of "the dampness of the
material lodge skin and cloth [and the] danger from powder explosions in the lodges," which
likely kept the men from being more thorough in their work. 53 Reynolds later came under severe
criticism from Bourke and others for destroying much of what the army badly needed . "General
Reynolds ordered everything destroyed and with a command undergoing every hardship, suffering
from intense cold and hunger. Tons of first-class meat and provisions were destroyed and many
things of positive necessity to the men [were] wantonly burned up. " 54 Indeed many of the men
were more interested in plundering the village for items they needed than in burning the camp.
Reynolds was frustrated by the men trying to retrieve what they badly needed because he thought
this effort wasted time and kept the troopers from following their orders as rapidly as he desired .
"I found great difficulty in preventing the men from pilfering. They delayed the firing of the
lodges to bring out robes and meat. I required them to throw these things down where they were
and ordered the destruction of the village be promptly made." 55
The guides found an elderly woman in one of the lodges laying on a couch, and the men
interviewed her. Apparently, she cleverly told them what they wanted to hear. According to the
old lady, the main chief of the encampment belonged to Crazy Horse, and most of the Indians in
the village were Sioux.56 The village was clearly Cheyenne, and Crazy Horse was far away at the
time, so this was false information, but the guides believed it anyway. Perhaps in consideration of
her age and the fact she told them useful lies, the men did not molest her or destroy her lodge.
When the Indians retook the village after the battle, they found only one lodge still standing.
They went inside to find the "old blind woman" entirely unharmed . The warriors talked about this
"all agreeing that the act showed the soldiers had good hearts." 57
The battle with the Cheyenne continued, but the army probably inflicted few casualties on
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the warriors. No one in the army knew how many Indians had been killed as Lieutenant Bourke
admitted, "We captured no bodies [but] we had excellent reasons for believing we had killed and
wounded many in the enemy' s ranks." 58 This was little more than wishful thinking, and Wooden
Leg reported that only, "One Cheyenne was killed by the soldiers. Another had his forearm badly
shattered. Braided Locks ... had the skin of one cheek furrowed by a bullet." Most of the Indians
fired on the soldiers at a distance and did little damage, but Two Moons, Bear Walks on a Ridge,
and Wooden Leg "centered an attack upon one certain soldier." Two Moons wielded a repeating
rifle. He "passed his hands up and down the barrel, not touching it, while making medicine. " He
finally said, "My medicine is good; watch me kill that soldier." He shot, but he missed his target.
Then Bear Walks on a Ridge aimed and fired his muzzle-loading rifle. Apparently, the bullet hit
the trooper in the back of the head. The warriors then "rushed upon the man and beat him to
death." 59 The trooper they had killed was probably Private Michael McCannon, whose body was
never found, but Wooden Leg' s account of the man ' s demise also has some similarities to the
death of Private Lorenzo Ayers.
Private Jeremiah Murphy reported that the Indians shot Private Ayers through the hand
and the leg before he died . The wounded man' s thigh bone was broken, so he was unable to
walk. Murphy and the blacksmith, Albert Glavinski, stayed with the Ayers until the Indians came
close, and Murphy had decided to flee . But the wounded man pleaded to his friend in a heartrending voice, "Oh Murphy; for Mercy' s sake, do not leave me in their hands." Murphy bravely
returned and "lifted the groaning man to his shoulders and tried to make his way through the
advancing savages, who poured a rain of bullets at him." Ayers was shot yet again, and
"Murphy' s carbine stock [was] smashed by a rifle-ball ." Murphy drew his revolver, and he fired
until it was empty. He then had no choice but abandon his friend and run for his life. "His
uniform was pierced by several bullets, but the brave man escaped unscathed ." Murphy fled into
some bushes for cover. When he noticed that the warriors had stopped firing at him, he looked
back, and he "saw them [the warriors] circling around the wounded man- ten or fifteen of them."
The Indians killed Ayers, and Murphy saw him scalped. For his courage, Murphy was later
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, the highest commendation given to United States
military personnel for bravery in combat. 60
Four soldiers were killed in battle that day including Private Peter Dowdy, who "was shot
through the head and instantly killed ." Six men were also wounded . The troopers retrieved two
of the bodies of the fallen, George Schneider and Peter Dowdy. Reynolds reported that there was
no means of taking the bodies with the army or burying them. This was a weak excuse because
the soldiers certainly could have tied the corpses onto horses and carried the them away, but the
army left them . The bodies of the two other fatalities, Michael McCannon and Lorenzo Ayers,
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were left with the Indians and never retrieved. The wounded men who could not ride were placed
on travois which were two poles connected by hides or blankets upon which the wounded men
could lay. Horses then dragged the devices .6 1
The battle continued for five hours while Reynolds became increasingly concerned about
his weak position, the aggressiveness of his adversaries, and the accuracy of their marksmanship.
"There was danger that the Indians now becoming bolder and stronger by creeping among the
logs, trees, sage brush, rocks and willows which were found from one end of our line to the other,
would pick off our men from concealed positions and where our return fire would not be as
effective as theirs. " 62 Clearly, the battle was going badly for the army. The men had fired more
than sixty rounds of ammunition each and had still been unable to keep their adversaries away.
Lieutenant Johnson reported that the position occupied by Captain Moore ' s two companies was
becoming increasingly threatened, and the command fell back. When they did so, the Indians
followed them and "boldly appeared and danced on the sage brush bench which he had occupied."
Moore' s men were in a position that was soon becoming untenable because "our line received the
Indians fire from the right, front and left." Twice Johnson came to Reynolds stating that the
threatened troopers must have reinforcements or fall back yet again. Initially, the Colonel seemed
to misunderstand the urgency of the message and disagreed with the report stating, "that isn' t so"
or "can' t be so." Finally, Reynolds saw the gravity of the situation. He realized that after the
army had destroyed the village, little more could be accomplished by holding the encampment,
and the Colonel ordered his hard-pressed command to withdraw from the village. The warriors
were quick to reoccupy the encampment. When the army was leaving the village from one side,
the Indians was entering it on the other.63
The soldiers marched up the Powder River for twenty miles to the mouth of Lodge Pole
Creek where they were supposed to meet General Crook' s command. Bourke stated that the men
"were very uncomfortable from want of adequate clothing." They were also out of food . "[We]
have no rations, not even for our poor wounded men ." A few of the officers had some crackers
in their saddle bags, and a few soldiers only had a small piece or two buffalo meat. This made a
"miserable apology for supper." Once the meat was cooked in some ashes, it was divided among
five or six troopers "each getting a mouthful only." Many of the men were also suffering from
the effects of the cold, and there were "a great number of cases of frosted and frozen feet, noses
and fingers" as well. Lieutenant Bourke suffered from "frozen toes," and the doctors painted
them with Iodine as a treatment. 64
Colonel Reynolds was concerned about the his ability to control the herd of Indian ponies
he had captured. They were far too valuable to abandon to his adversaries, but there was no best
option of what to do with them. He considered shooting the animals, but he "feared that [he]
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might require the ammunition for other purposes," meaning that he was concerned that the
warriors would again attack his command. The Colonel worried that the use of hundreds of
bullets to kill the horses potentially left him at a disadvantage . Many of his men had fired more
than sixty rounds that day, and the troopers probably had insufficient ammunition left to engage
the Indians again in a lengthy battle. 65
Reynolds hoped that his problems would be solved when me met General Crook at the
mouth of Lodge Pole Creek, but the Colonel was disappointed when he arrived at the location at
sundown to find that the General had not yet arrived . Crook was supposed to be waiting with
"pack trains and fresh troops to guard our stock and give us relief," but Reynold ' s men would
have to fend for themselves that night. The General and his command could have been on hand,
but Crook had advanced slowly that day. Early in the morning, it took his men four hours to ride
ten miles. When the command was within a half mile of the Powder River, Crook thought an
Indian village might be nearby, and he fell back a mile and a half, so the Indians would not see
him. This tardiness did nothing to help Reynolds, and his men and their horses were completely
exhausted as the Colonel explained, "We had marched fifty four miles and fought four hours
during the last 26 hours, had no sleep during the previous night, and in fact no rest during the
previous 36 hours, and [we had] marched ... 73 miles from the camp on the Tongue River." 66
That night too few guards were placed over the captured horse herd, and the exhausted
troopers, who had gone two days without sleep, were in no position to watch the animals
carefully. Wooden Leg and other warriors followed the soldiers and approached their camp at
night. "We crept toward the herd ." One of the men would whisper, "I see my horse. " Then
another man said, "There is mine." Most of the warriors could not see their animals, so they took
any horse that was nearby. Wooden Leg was pleased, "I got my own favorite animal. " After
retrieving many Indian ponies, the men tried to take some of the soldiers' mounts, but the
troopers shot at them, and the warriors concentrated on taking their own animals. The horses
helped the Indians a great deal because they "let the women and some of the old people ride." 67
By morning the rest of the Indian ponies had strayed far enough from the camp that a
small group of Indians were able to retrieve them. When the animals were still in view, going
over a ridge only three or four miles away, Reynolds "to the surprise of all" refused to make any
attempt to recapture them. While the army still had about one hundred Indian ponies, which
meant that most of the horses were lost, some of the men severely criticized this decision. "Great
dissatisfaction now arose among all, several of the officers venting their ill-feelings in splenetic
[i.e. bitter] criticism, and openly charging Reynolds with incapacity." 68 The Colonel later
defended his decision not to pursue the horses, "I deemed it inadvisable in the condition of our
horses to attempt a long and doubtful chase after the ponies." He further argued that he must
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keep his mounts from breaking down because they would be needed in the summer months for
additional campaigning. 69 This excuse had little merit because the army could easily buy more
horses for future operations.
Some of Reynolds' men also bitterly criticized his leadership in the battle. Strahorn stated
that abandoning the bodies of two men to the Indians was "utterly inexcusable." 70 Lieutenant
Bourke was critical of almost every aspect of the Colonel ' s leadership. Bourke wrote that leaving
the bodies of the dead were "errors" that showed "Reynolds' imbecility." The Lieutenant further
sated that the refusal of his leader to allow his men to take buffalo robes and food from the Indian
camp showed "bad management." Only grudgingly did Bourke admit that Reynolds was "very
cool under fire, discharging duties, at least as far as he understood them, efficiently and cooly." 71
The attack on the village was costly to its inhabitants, and Wooden Leg stated that, "the
Cheyennes were rendered very poor." The warrior had little left but the clothes on his back, and
everything else was gone. The victims of the attack trudged to the north and east, and they had to
sleep in the open for three nights. They were hungry because only a small number of women had
"little chunks of dry meat in the small packs." Few of them had buffalo robes to protect them
from the cold, and "there was hard freezing at night and there was mud and water by day." On
the fourth day, they arrived at the camp of the Ogallala Sioux who "received us hospitably, as we
knew they would ." Many of the Indians called to their friends, "Cheyennes, come and eat here,"
and the refugees were soon fed, housed, and clothed. The main leader of the Sioux was the
famous warrior chief Crazy Horse. Soon the Cheyenne and various groups of Sioux met and
decided that they should join their forces to resist the army .72
Crook' s campaign and irresponsible attack on the village had done little to hurt the
military abilities of the Indians but had done much to expand the war. The warriors had suffered
few casualties, and they were soon able to replenish their losses of supplies and lodges. Before
this unprovoked attack, the Northern Cheyenne had little interest in the issues that brought the
Sioux to war. After the battle of Powder River, the Cheyenne became allies of the Sioux, and
they would participate in many of the campaigns during the rest of the year. Additionally, the
army thought they had attacked the village of Crazy Horse and damaged the ability of the Sioux
to fight. But their error in striking the Cheyenne village had the opposite effect because the army
had given the famous war chief and many of the his Sioux allies additional manpower to use
against the soldiers.
Retreat and Accusations
General Crook' s command finally met with Colonel Reynolds' column of troopers at noon
on 18 March 1876 to the great relief of the Colonel ' s men. The General "was much pleased to
learn of our having encountered the Sioux and taken their village." A few Indians were still
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following the soldiers perhaps hoping to seize some of the ponies still held by the cavalry. One
warrior, "wearing a war bonnet" made the mistake of coming within range of the General ' s rifle.
Known as an excellent marksman, Crook took aim and apparently hit the man who fell from his
saddle. His comrades took the wounded man away, but the troopers captured the man ' s horse,
saddle, buffalo robe, blanket, and war bonnet. 73
The warriors followed the army and occasionally took shots into the soldiers' camp fires .
The Indians were probably looking for an opportunity to retrieve the remaining horses. Crook
feared that the warriors would continue to cause trouble as long as the cavalry still had some of
their mounts, so he ordered the animals killed . The troopers shot some of the horses, but they
also slit some of their throats as well. When the animals were in their death pain, they made "a
dismal trumpeting," and the Indians knew what the sound meant. "With one yell of defiance and a
parting volley, they left us alone for the rest of the night. " The soldiers were so hungry that they
cut large chunks of meat from the dead ponies, which they cooked in the ashes of their campfires.
Even though some of the men had misgivings about eating horse flesh, they were desperate for
food, and they found the meat "sweet and nourishing." 74
The hungry and fatigued men rode for days until they reached Fort Reno on 21 March.
After resting there for a couple of days, the command resumed its march. Fortunately, the
weather was getting warmer. While the men still faced heavy snow, there was also much rain, and
the soldiers had to deal with sticky mud . During this march, fifty-eight horses and thirty-two
mules were either shot or abandoned because they could not longer walk. The men also
continued to suffer from fatigue and hunger. "First we were put on half rations and then on
quarter rations and were very fortunate to get back ... before running out of rations entirely." 75
The soldiers arrived back at Fort Fetterman on 25 March 1876. The campaign was over, but the
recriminations were just about to begin.
Crook was clearly pleased with the outcome of the campaign during the return journey,
and he sent two telegrams to his superiors from Fort Reno on 22 and 23 March bragging about
the success in the battle. He boasted that Reynolds had "attacked and destroyed" the Indian
encampment. The General further stated with clear exaggeration, "We succeeded in breaking up
Crazy Horse' s band ... killing more than one hundred Indians and burning their village on the
Little Powder River. An immense quantity of ammunition, arms and dried meats were stored in
their lodges, all of which we destroyed ." 76 His statement that "we succeeded" and "we
destroyed" were efforts for Crook to share in Reynolds' victory. But two days after he sent the
second telegram, the General arrived at Fort Fetterman and immediately charged Colonel
Reynolds with dereliction of duty. Much had changed since Crook had praised the Colonel ' s
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efforts, and the victory at the Battle of Powder River was then called a failure .
The tired, cold, and hungry soldiers had complained for days about their discomfort on the
campaign, and they found much to blame in the conduct of Reynolds, many of their officers, and
anyone else on the expedition. Lieutenant Morton probably provoked the recriminations when he
had taken out some of his misery by aiming "ill-judged criticisms" toward Robert Strahorn, the
correspondent for the Daily Rocky Mountain News. Strahorn had conducted himself admirably in
the battle and had fought bravely with Lieutenant Bourke' s men in the village, and the
newspaperman refused to take Morton's unfair criticism and threatened to retaliate and "publish
the truth" of the campaign by printing its failures . Bourke stated that Crook had "no other
remedy left but to probe the matter to the quick by a General Court Martial." 77 The General
decided to defray any possible criticisms that could be leveled against him by finding someone else
to blame.
Colonel Reynolds later claimed that Crook stated that he would drop the charges against
him if the Colonel would file charges against Captain Noyes and Captain Moore. Dutifully,
Reynolds brought an accusation against Noyes stating that he had neglected his duty by halting his
men for lunch when they were so badly needed in the fight for the village. While the court found
Noyes guilty, Crook stated that the Captain had only "committed an error in judgment," and he
was immediately released from arrest. 78 This trial was practically a farce probably staged to make
it appear that the army was dealing with its problems, but the trial of Reynolds had a much more
senous purpose.
This court martial was held in January 18 77, several months after the summer and fall
campaigns against the Sioux had been concluded. The Battle of Powder River had long been
overshadowed by General Crook' s further campaigns that resulted in the battles of the Rosebud in
June 1876 and Slim Buttes in September of 1876. The conduct at Powder River was largely
forgotten by then, and the court martial of Colonel Reynolds was little more than Crook ' s
vindictiveness.
Reynolds was charged with disobedience to orders, mismanaging the battle, leaving the
dead and wounded on the battlefield, and allowing the Indian ponies to be recaptured. The
General testified that he had given verbal orders to Reynolds, which the subordinate did not
follow . The Colonel argued that he followed the instructions given to him . Reynolds further
defended himself by saying that Crook was pleased with the campaign until the threat that
criticisms might appear in the newspapers. The Colonel testified that the General even
"congratulated" him and his men for their success in battle. Reynolds further criticized his
Crook' s decisions, "There was no reason whatsoever for dividing the command" which left the
Colonel with too few men to accomplish all their tasks. Reynolds claimed he had done his best
under the circumstances.79
The Colonel had little chance for real justice in a court convened to condemn him and to
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vindicate the General, and Reynolds was found guilty on all charges. His punishment was to be
suspended from service for one year without pay. The Colonel realized that his military career
was over, and he soon retired from the army. With the exception of abandoning his dead on the
battlefield, Reynolds had managed the battle competently. Perhaps he made a number of
mistakes, but each decision seemed logical considering his insufficient manpower and his
exhausted troops. He might have done as well as anyone else in the same situation, and a
prominent historian of the Indian campaigns has called the decision of the court, "cruelly
unjust. " 80
The Battle of Powder River should be placed in context of other similar campaigns against
the Indians. At the battles of the Washita in November 1868, Slim Buttes in September 1876, and
Dull Knife' s village on the Red Fork in November of 1876, the army fought similar engagements.
In each case, the soldiers took an Indian village and burned it, but the army later withdrew when
faced with determined counter attacks by Indian warriors. But these battle were viewed as great
accomplishments.81 While these outcomes were almost identical to that at Powder River, this
engagement was considered a failure because General Crook wanted to defray any criticism by
ruining the career of a competent subordinate. Perhaps the most important aspect of the
campaign that culminated in the Battle of Powder River was what it showed about Crook ' s
character and quality of leadership. The General clearly underestimated the fighting ability of his
adversaries at Powder River, and he would do so again at the Battle of the Rosebud.
To a certain extent, Crook was the victim of his own propaganda. In condemning Reynolds for
his actions at Powder River, the General had declared that the campaign and battle were failures .
Crook now needed a victory to salvage his reputation and that of his command.
The Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition
The attempts to deal crippling blows on the Sioux in the early spring of 1876 had been
failures . When the weather improved, the army took the field again. General John Gibbon left
Fort Ellis with 450 men to march southeast. General Alfred Terry advanced from Fort Abraham
Lincoln with 950 men, and he was joined by George Armstrong Custer with 650 men in the
Seventh Cavalry. General Crook' s command had received reinforcements, and it was then a
formidable force comprised of 10 companies from the 3rd Cavalry, 5 companies from the 2nd
Cavalry, 2 companies from the 4 th Infantry regiment, and 3 companies from the 9th Infantry
regiment. This forced numbered 1002 men and 47 officers. They marched from Fort Fetterman
on 29 May 1876. 82
The advance was much easier than the trying campaign two months earlier. Initially, the
biggest challenge for the men had been fording streams, but tragedy struck on 30 May when a
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man, Private Francis Tierney, accidentally shot himself while chopping wood . He died on 7 June,
and the troopers were forced to bury the first casualty of the expedition. Lieutenant Bourke
thought the campaign was quite dull, and he was pleased when "the monotony of camp life was
agreeably broken by an attack upon our lines made in a most energetic manner by the Sioux and
Cheyennes" on 9 June. The army heard reports that Crazy Horse had threatened that he would
attack any soldiers who crossed the Tongue River. When the column reached that stream, the
troopers were extra vigilant, and they placed a line of men at the top of the nearby hills to warn of
any enemy advance. These sentinels soon saw Indians, and the troopers started to ride "their
horses around in a circle, a warning that they had seen something dangerous." The Indians
advanced in good order, and they forced the soldiers in forward positions to withdraw. The
warriors soon hid among the rocks from which they began to fire on the army camp. Fortunately
for the troopers, the Indians ' shots inflicted few casualties. The warriors directed much of their
fire on the tents that were unoccupied at that time, but "bullets ripped through the canvas, split
the ridge poles, smashed the pipes of the ... stoves, and imbedded themselves in the tail boards of
the wagons." Only two troopers were slightly wounded by glancing bullets. 83
Even though the shots from the warriors did little serious damage, General Crook had to
remove this threat. He ordered his men to mount and advance on the Indian positions. In a fine
show of discipline, the command mounted and charged across the Tongue River. They soon saw
their "assailants scampering like deer." The cavalry "rushed forward with a yell," and their
adversaries fired a few more shots at them before they retreated into the hills.84 The situation was
potentially serious because the Indians might return in larger numbers, but Lieutenant Bourke
seemed little concerned, and he thought that such attacks did the army much good as he had while
marching to the Powder River three months earlier. " It is to be hoped the Indians may make
attacks of this kind every night. " He explained that "no greater advantage can accrue to young
troops than to keep them constantly under fire. " In reacting to this threat, the new men in the
army would learn their tasks well, become veterans, and learn "the importance of implicit
obedience to authority." Also, the officers would also become more efficient in their duties.85
Little Hawk described an attack on the cavalry when the army was near the Tongue River.
Some of the warriors decided to strike at night because they thought they could stampede the
cavalry' s horses. The Indians crept close to the army camp and charged. To their surprise, the
soldiers appeared to be waiting form them. They "must have been sitting up with guns in their
hands for a rain of bullets" met the attackers. The warriors fired for a while, but there were no
casualties, as far as Little Hawk knew, on either side. The attackers then drew off and returned to
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their camp. 86
As Crook' s command improved in competency, it also increased in size. The Crow
Indians had long hated the Sioux and Cheyenne, and they were eager to assist the army in fighting
their old enemies. On 14 June, 175 Crow warriors arrived in camp. These warriors impressed
Lt. Bourke who said that they would be very helpful to the command because they could "follow
the trails of the hostile Sioux and discover their villages. " This was a needed skill which the
soldiers did not have. In addition, the Crows would also spare the soldiers the tiresome duty of
scouting in advance of the cavalry column. Also, these warriors were well armed with breechloading rifles, many of which were the same weapons used by the army. In addition, eighty-six
Shoshone warriors soon arrived. They also shared a hatred for the Sioux and wanted to fight
against their old adversaries.87 Including the infantry, the cavalry, and the Indian allies, Crook' s
column numbered at least 1,325 men, which was indeed a formidable force. 88
Frank Grouard and many of the scouts also arrived on 14 June, and many of the troopers
celebrated their return. Crook and his men continued to gain confidence, and they believed they
could deal with any threat from their adversaries. As Lt. Bourke observed, "No one now doubts
we shall be victorious .... [and] It was evident the General meant business." 89 Finerty also noted,
"Crook was bristling for a fight. " 90 The General was soon to get the battle he wanted .
The Crow Indians told Crook that they believed that Crazy Horse' s camp was located
farther down the Tongue River or on one of its small tributaries. Most importantly they, " were
quite positive we should be able to surprise it" by a forced march. Crook believed this to be a
good opportunity, and he "considered it worthwhile to make the attempt. " He resolved to mount
a decisive attack by breaking away from his slow supply train and hitting the camp before the
Indians knew of his approach.91 He ordered his men to be ready to march on the morning of 16
June. The General stated that each man would carry food for four days in his saddle bags. "No
tents were taken, and neither wagons or ambulances .... Many officers as well as the soldiers
[took] a good sized piece of dried elk meat, some hard bread, sugar, coffee, and at least one
hundred rounds of ammunition ." 92
Crook wanted to move as rapidly as possible, but he also wanted to bring as many soldiers
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as he could with him. His infantry could certainly bring greater numbers and firepower to bear in
any engagement, but they had to be present to have any impact on a battle. These men on foot,
often called "Walk-a-heaps" by the Indians, frequently walked impressive distances, but they were
incapable of keeping up with the cavalry on rapid marches. Crook' s solution was to place 175
foot soldiers on mules, the only mounts available. The animals were taken from the supply train.
The mules had a reputation for being headstrong, and they were not used to being ridden.
Similarly, many of the infantrymen had no experience or skill on horseback.
On 15 June, these men tried to learn to ride to the great amusement of the experienced
horsemen. Frank Grouard claimed, "I never saw so much fun in all my life. The valley for a mile
in every direction was filled with bucking mules, frightened infantrymen, broken saddles and
applauding spectators." He further saw, "some of the most ludicrous mishaps imaginable." 93 Lt.
Bourke also enjoyed the scene, "Amusing incidents there were in plenty and many scenes of grand
and lofty tumbling occurred when the improvised dragoons attempted for the first time to mount
their charges." The mules clearly gave a good account of themselves in resisting the foot soldiers,
but the infantry was finally able to master their mounts .94
Finerty found much to praise in the young men who soon marched into battle. They were
"careless, courageous and eminently light hearted," and the "majority were of either Irish or
German birth or parentage." The command was "a fine organization" in which four fifths of the
officers had graduated from West Point, the United States Army military academy, and were
professional and able leaders. The men arose early on the morning of 16 June. Every man was
mounted, and the "splendid" column began its march to the northwest. 95
While Finerty laughed at the infantrymen trying to learn to ride their mules as had
everyone else, he still had much to learn about taking proper care of his equipment and weapons.
After a brief rest, Finerty got back on his horse, and the muzzle of his rifle accidentally struck the
hammer of his revolver. The hammer was resting on the primer in the cartridge, and the sudden
jolt discharged the weapon. The shock of "explosion" made the newspaperman think that
someone had "hit me a vigorous blow with a stick on the right rear of my pantaloons," and his
horse recoiled from the shock of the bullet. The ball blew off the back of the saddle but did no
further damage. A trooper rode to Finerty and assured him, "You were not made to be killed by
bullets, or that would have fixed you ." The reporter was so shaken that he could not respond
clearly when Captain Guy Henry asked him "Is the bullet in your person?" In confusion Finerty
stated, "I don' t know." The officer was quite amused by a man who could not tell if he had been
shot and said, "Then by Jove it is about time you found out." He rode away laughing_%
Crook had wanted to approach the Sioux camp and strike it before his adversaries had
time to react, but his march was hardly stealthy. The column soon came upon a large herd of
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buffalo. While the General ' s disciplined troopers stayed in ranks, the Crow and Shoshone scouts
swept into action and killed many of the large animals. This big and noisy hunting foray certainly
meant that the Sioux would learn of their advance. Crook was "annoyed" by this action, "which
could not help alarming the wary foe with whom he had to contend; but nothing could check the
Indians. " 97
After the buffalo hunt, the men continued their march. Lt. Bourke commented on the
beauty of the landscape stating that the grass was "emerald green." There were few trees in the
region, "but wild-roses by the thousand laid their delicate beauties at our feet. " These large
numbers of rose bushes in the area gave the Rosebud River its name. After a lengthy march of 3 5
or 40 miles, the troopers finally made came on the banks of "the extreme head-waters of the
Rosebud. " The tired men dined on buffalo meat and made camp. Believing that there were
hostile Sioux Indians nearby, the army took proper precautions that night. They established their
lines in a hollow square with the horse inside, so they could not be stolen. Each man slept with
his saddle for a pillow and kept his rifle nearby in case it would be needed on short notice. Late in
the night, the Indian scouts returned stating that they had surprised a small band of Sioux hunters.
These warriors ran away so rapidly that they left their meat that they were cooking on the fire .
The soldiers were concerned as Bourke explained, "we are now right in among the hostiles and
[they] may strike ... at any hour." 98
The location of the army camp was probably known to any Sioux who happened to be in
the area. The Shoshone and Crow warriors celebrated their hunt long into the night. These
"boastful, howling Indians" lit fires and made much noise, while the soldiers were under strict
orders not to light any campfires and to remain quiet. When Captain Alexander Sutorius wrapped
himself in a blanket before he went to sleep, he commented to Finerty, "We will have a fight
tomorrow, mark my words- I feel it in the air. " 99
The Indian Warriors
When the winter weather ended in 1876, the Sioux and Cheyenne began to assemble in the
area of the Yellowstone River including its tributary, the Rosebud. They arrived for weeks. Some
of them came from various government reservations, while others had been away from the white
man' s influence the previous winter. The Sioux groups included the Miniconjou, Hunkpapa,
Oglala, Brule, Sans Arc, Sihasapa, and a few Santee, who had long been impoverished after
fighting the whites in the Great Sioux Uprising in Minnesota in 1862. In addition, groups of
Northern Cheyenne and even Southern Cheyenne, who came long distances, also converged on
the area. The combined numbers of warriors was large by any standard. One prominent study
has estimated that the number of Indian lodges was at least 461 , but it would have been much

97

Ibid., pp. 119-20.

98

Bourke, Diary, p. 325 .

9

9Finerty, p. 122.

26
larger. 100
The Indian ponies had become weak because in the winter when the grass was covered
with snow, and the animals were unable to eat it. But when the weather improved in the late
spring, the grass began to grow, and the horses became stronger and able to sustain lengthy and
rapid marches. This meant that the warriors were then capable of traveling long distances and
striking at their enemies. As Wooden Leg stated, many of the young men were anxious to find
and fight the soldiers, "but the chiefs and old men all urged us to keep away from the white
men ." 10 1 This changed after the optimistic vision from Sitting Bull because he stated that the
Indians would be victorious in an upcoming fight. This made many more Sioux and Cheyenne
willing to risk battle.
Sitting Bull was a respected leader of the Hunkpapa Sioux, and he believed his people
should live far away from white people and get nothing from them. He believed his followers
were wealthy in everything they needed, and many Indians respected him because he was "a man
whose medicine was good ." The chief had a "kind heart and good judgment as to the best course
of conduct," and he was considered "brave, but peaceable." 102
The Hunkpapa and the other Sioux groups came together in their annual Sun Dance from
7 to 10 June. This was an elaborate ceremony that was to assure that the buffalo would be fertile,
and that the men would have success in the hunt. As part of the ceremony, Sitting Bull sought a
vision what would help his people understand the future. Jumping Bull used an awl, which was
used to punch small holes in leather, and cut one hundred pieces of skin out of Sitting Bull' s arms.
The chief then danced around a pole for hours. He finally stopped and stood looking just below
the sun up, and he saw a vision. The chief saw soldiers and horses as numerous as locust falling
upside down into an Indian village. A few Indians also feel upside down. Sitting Bull also heard
a voice that said, "These soldiers do not possess ears. They are to die, but you are not supposed
to take their spoils [plunder their bodies]." 103 The upside-down Indians meant that warriors
would die as well, but the vision clearly showed that the Sioux and their allies were going to win a
great victory. This prophecy came true twice before the end of the month because the Indians
would win the battles of the Rosebud and the Little Bighorn within a few weeks.
The prominent war chief of the Oglala Sioux was Crazy Horse who enjoyed a fine
reputation among his people and the admiration of his adversaries. Lieutenant Bourke met Crazy
Horse after the campaigns of 1876 and described how the Sioux regarded him. "All Indians gave
him a high reputation for courage and generosity. In advancing upon an enemy, none of his
warriors were allowed to pass him." In addition, "He had made hundreds of friends by his charity
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towards the poor, as it was point of honor with him never to keep anything for himself, excepting
weapons of war. I never heard an Indian mention his name save in terms of respect. " 104
While he was not a medicine man, he clearly led a charmed life, and, reportedly, nine
horses had been killed out from under him when he was riding them. He had a impressive
reputation, and his example of bravery made the other warriors more courageous. Crazy Horse
said he had once seen a vision of a man who came out of a lake on horseback . The apparition
told the leader neither to wear a war bonnet nor braid the tale of his pony, and the vision told him
that no bullet would ever kill him. This prophecy proved to be accurate because the war chief
was killed by a bayonet thrust, not by a bullet, in 1877. Following the advice of the vision, Crazy
Horse never wore a war bonnet and never braided the tale of his horse. He was not involved in
tribal councils, and he never took part in treaty negotiations. Above all, he was a warrior, and he
was among the best military leaders in the Sioux nation. 105
Late in the day of 16 June Cheyenne scouts rode into the main Indian camp making wolf
howls which signified danger. The warriors had found their adversaries on the Rosebud, and the
banks of the stream were black with soldiers and their Indian allies. Enthusiastically, the young
Sioux and Cheyenne men called for action and looked to Crazy Horse for leadership, but the
elders of the tribes were cautious. They reminded the warriors that the women, the aged, and the
young still needed to be protected in camp. But the aggressive young men argued that they
should attack the soldiers before the army could strike the camp. Crazy Horse finally suggested
that the older men stay and protect the camp while most of the young men should attack and drive
the soldiers away. This council seemed sound, and the warriors prepared to attack. The Indians
divided themselves into war parties comprised of men from the various groups. They put on their
war paint and special clothing for combat. They probably rode twenty-five miles throughout
much of the night, and they arrive at the army's camp early in the morning, at the right time to
surprise the soldiers.106
Before he left for battle that evening, Spotted Wolf, the father of White Shield, gave his
son some good advice. The older man told White Shield that he should not allow his pony to
graze before the battle. " If a horse' s stomach is not full , he can run a long way; if his stomach is
full, he soon gets tired ." Spotted Wolf also told his son that he should drink plenty of water
before the battle because he would have little chance to drink during combat. In addition, Spotted
Wolf said, "I will put some medicine on you ." He placed a whistle around his son's neck made of
bone from an eagle' s wing and said, "If anyone runs up to you to shoot you, make this noise
[blowing on the whistle] and the bullet will not hurt you." 107 Apparently, Spotted Wolfs
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medicine was good because White Shield survived the battle, and he also fought bravely.
The Indians were well armed . Many of them wielded lever-action Spencer, Winchester,
and Henry rifles. These weapons were rapid-fire repeaters, which could do considerable damage
at close range. In comparison, the soldiers used the single-shot Springfield Model 1873 rifle,
which had a slow rate of fire . This weapon was accurate when shooting at a distance of several
hundred yards, but it was at a decided disadvantage in close combat when the rate of fire was the
most important factor in effectiveness. The fact that the warriors had more efficient weapons than
the army was an important reason why they were victorious in both the battles of the Rosebud
and the Little Bighorn. The Indians also enjoyed a numerical advantage in both engagements.
Crazy Horse later claimed there were 1500 warriors who struck the army camp at the Rosebud
River in four war parties.108 In an impressive feat of movement and coordination, these war
groups arrived simultaneously early in the morning and caught the soldiers off guard.
The Battle of the Rosebud: Initial Attacks
General Crook ordered the soldiers awakened at 3 AM on the morning of 17 June 1876,
and the command was on the march at 6 AM. Crook hoped that his men would soon locate the
Indian village, so he could attack it. Henry W. Daly reported that the march was challenging.
"The Rosebud is as crooked as a corkscrew, and the country is very rough." The men went
"through the narrow, winding valley, unable to see fifty feed ahead ." 109 The men were cheerful
when they marched that morning. They joked with each other and gave chewing tobacco to their
friends . A few of the younger soldiers, showing the skill of experienced cavalrymen, held the
pommels of the saddles, leaned forward against their horses, and took brief naps without falling
off their mounts. The column was ordered to halt at 8 AM and unsaddle their mounts to allow
the animals to graze on the grass nearby. The march the previous day had been challenging, and
Crook wanted to give the men and their horses a chance to get their strength back. 11 0
Many of the soldiers rested along the banks of the Rosebud . John Finerty commented on
the "thick growth of wild roses" along the stream. As the men relaxed, Finerty noticed that the
soldiers were surrounded by hills that "seemed to rise on every side, and we were within easy
musket shot of those most remote." The army was in a position of a potential trap . Indians on
the surrounding hills could fire down upon the soldiers, and the warriors would have a big
advantage over their adversaries . Fortunately for the army, Shoshone and Crow warriors were
scouting in advance of this position, and they were in a position to warn the soldiers if the Sioux
and Cheyenne were nearby.
Finerty was laying in the grass and resting his head on his saddle at 8:30 AM, when he and
the soldiers heard a few shots coming from the hills to the north. Captain Alexander Sutorius was
from Switzerland, and Lieutenant Adolphus H. Von Luettwitz, who was from Prussia, sat nearby
smoking when the shots rang out. Sutorius stated, "They are shooting buffaloes over there,"
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perhaps assuming that the Indian scouts were hunting again. The men began to realize that the
shots were fired in more than one direction because there was an "alternate rise and fall in the
reports [sounds]" of the guns, and they began to worry that something else might be taking place.
At that point, the troopers saw twenty or forty of their Indian scouts appear on the crest of the
hills to the north riding toward the soldiers "with incredible speed." The Crow and Shoshone
scouts were clearly excited, and they were shouting, "Heap [many] Sioux! Heap Sioux!" 111
Captain Anson Mills was the first officer to see the attacking warriors and perceive the
danger. Mills did not understand the shouting because of his poor hearing, but he saw the
agitated scouts and went to investigate. He rode to the crest of a nearby hill and looked north. "I
saw on the crest of the horizon about two miles distant, great numbers of moving objects." He
only stared briefly before he knew what they were. "I soon came to the conclusion that they were
Indians in great numbers." He ordered his men to mount shouting, " Saddle up, there-saddle up,
there, quick! " General Crook was unable to see the approaching Indians because he was nearer
to the river, and the hills blocked his view. Mills soon found him playing cards with some of his
officers and told the General of the advancing warriors. Crook ordered Mills to report to him
with his command as soon as possible. The General began to direct the deployment of his men,
and he ordered his subordinate officer to march as rapidly as possible to the "higher ground to
take the bluffs and hold them. " 112
The cavalry scout, Frank Grouard, was resting when the Crow and Shoshone called the
alarm . One of them, an Indian called Humpy, a hunchbacked Crow, was yelling " Sioux" as he
approached the camp. At the same time, Grouard heard the Sioux war cry, and he saw the
warriors attacking over the hills. Everyone sprang into action. Initially, the soldiers were poorly
prepared to meet their charging adversaries, and only the Indian scouts were ready to hold the line
and meet the advance. Grouard admitted, "I believe if it had not been for the Crows, the Sioux
would have killed half of our command before the soldiers were in a position to meet the attack. "
11 3

The combat was at close quarters and many Crows and Sioux engaged in hand-to-hand
fighting . Grouard was in a position from which he could see the entire encounter, and he said it
"was the prettiest sight in the way of a fight that I had ever seen." The two sides were engaged at
such close quarters that the scout "could hardly distinguish our allies from the hostiles." Only
when the soldiers advanced and started firing did the Sioux fall back. The troopers had trouble
telling the two groups of Indians from the other, but the Sioux and Crows easily recognized each
other, and they knew whom to fight. 114
Many of the Indian scouts faced the fight with grim determination. Grouard saw a
wounded Crow warrior sitting on the ground during the battle. He had been shot just above the
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knee and his leg "was terribly shattered. His horse was lying dead by his side." The man seemed
to have lost interest in his wound, and he would often "yell like a madman" obviously in support
of the other scouts engaged in the battle. 11 5
Captain Sutorius and Lieutenant Von Luettwitz were soon mounted with their troops, and
they anxiously awaited permission to engage the enemy. Luettwitz asked impatiently, "Why the
devil don' t they order us to charge?" As the officers waited to be employed in battle Sutorius
turned to the reporter, John Finerty, and asked him what he thought of the delay. The reporter
almost changed the subject when he stated rather absent mindedly, " It is the anniversary of
Bunker Hill .... The day is of good omen. " 11 6 The Battle of Bunker hill took place on 17 June
1775 during the American War oflndependence. On that day 101 years earlier, the poorlytrained American militia had shown their fighting ability by mowing down more than one
thousand of the highly effective British infantry sent against them. While the Americans were
eventually forced to retreat, they had fought well, and many Americans considered the battle to be
a big success. 11 7 Sutorius was pleased to realize that they were fighting on a date that celebrated
the fighting ability of Americans, and he used the news to inspire his men, " It is the anniversary of
Bunker Hill . We' re in luck. " The men responded by waving their rifles in acknowledgment. 11 8
A messenger, Lieutenant Henry Lemly, soon arrived with orders from Crook, "Your
battalion will charge those bluffs on the center." Immediately, Sutorius and Luettwitz led their
men in support of the attack by Captain Mills.11 9 Captain Mills had marched his men on
horseback as rapidly as possible through the rough terrain that was littered with broken rocks. As
soon as the ground became more level and suitable for an attack, the Captain gave the orders
"front into line," and he told the bugler to sound the charge. Mills could see two prominent rocky
ridges, and when his command reached the first one, the warriors on that position began to fall
back. The Captain ordered his men to dismount and to continue the attack up the hill on foot.
The soldiers engaged their adversaries at the foot of the ridge and charged right through them.
The Sioux soon fell back to the top of the ridge .
This engagement allowed Mills the opportunity to have a good look at the enemy
warriors. "These Indians were most hideous, every one being painted in the most hideous colors
and designs, stark naked, except their moccasins, breech clouts, and head gear, the latter
consisting of feathers and horns; some of the horses being also painted." In fact, "their shouting
and personal appearance was so hideous that it terrified the horses more than our men and
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rendered them almost uncontrollable before we dismounted and placed them behind the rocks." 120
Despite the disgusting appearance of his adversaries, the Captain clearly admired their
fighting ability. "The Indians proved then and there that they were the best cavalry soldiers on
earth." This was high praise indeed because Mills was a highly-experienced officer who fought as
a cavalry commander for four years in the American Civil War 1861-5, and he knew able fighters
when he saw them . The Sioux clearly demonstrated their exceptional skill in the engagement with
the troopers. "In charging up towards us they exposed little of their person, hanging on with one
arm around the neck and one leg over the horse, firing and lancing from underneath the horse' s
necks, so that there was no part of the Indian at which we could aim. " Many years later, Mills
lamented the demise of the fighting power of the Sioux. They were "then the best cavalry in the
world; their like will never be seen again. " 121
Captain Mills observed the Sioux as they attacked. "The Indians came not in a line but in
flocks or herds like buffalo." They also advanced in great numbers, "and they piled in upon us
until I think there must have been one thousand or fifteen hundred in our immediate front." When
the Captain noticed that the enemy warriors were reluctant to storm the cavalry's position, he
continued to be aggressive and ordered his men to charge another "the second" ridge . This
position was taken with little difficulty and Mills again ordered his men to take up positions near
the boulders on the hills. 122 The Captain had shown initiative, but his more-advanced location
offered few advantages, and he had over-extended his lines leaving some men in danger.
Henry W. Daly saw the approach of the Indians differently than Captain Mills. When the
Sioux and Cheyenne advanced in a "solid phalanx," Daly stated, "There were no handsomer
Indians and no better riders." They were dressed splendidly. "From the forehead to the
waistline, each warrior was painted with stripes of black and red. Their gorgeous headdresses
fanned the breeze like the tails of a boy' s kite." The warriors showed discipline and great skill,
and "they attacked with great fury and with the precision of trained cavalry." The Sioux and
Cheyenne stated that they only wanted to fight the soldiers, and they shouted to the Crows and
Shoshones, "You go home! We want to kill only white men! " But the Indian allies of the
troopers were unmoved by this trick and remained loyal to the army. 123
Daly was one of the "packers" who took care of the horses and mules used to carry
supplies. Even though they were not combat troops, they were badly needed in battle. They
advanced, were placed in a position on the center of the line, and held a ledge when the Indians
attacked. The white men were soon surrounded, and the warriors attempted to overwhelm them
by a series of attacks. The Indians made a determined advance and came so close to Daly and the
others that "we fired point blank, but on they came." A few of them reached the top of the ledge,
"and one of them came at me with a tomahawk." The warrior struck Daly with the weapon
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giving the packer "a scar over my right eye," which was a constant reminder to him of the action
that day. The packers were unable to hold their position long and soon had to withdraw.124
When the firing began, Lieutenant Bourke was with General Crook, and the younger
officer took the opportunity to lead men into battle. The Lieutenant accompanied his dismounted
cavalrymen in their attack on the ridges. The aggressive officer was disappointed that his
adversaries fell back when his men came close to their positions. But the Sioux returned fire and
inflicted a severe wound on Sergeant Maher, who was hit in the right arm near the elbow.
Bourke was very impressed with Elmer A. Snow, a trumpeter with the company, who had
gallantly accompanied the Lieutenant in the attack. When orders came to fall back, Bourke and
Snow, who were both still on horseback, found themselves isolated far ahead of the other
soldiers. A group of "thirty or more" Sioux, seeing their vulnerability, attacked the two men .
The Lieutenant fired his rifle and shouted, hoping to distract the warriors. The Sioux halted
momentarily allowing Bourke and Snow the chance of racing their horses four hundred yards
back to the solders. The Lieutenant was lucky. The trumpeter was not. "My usual good fortune
attended me, but poor Snow got back to our lines badly shot through bother arms, near the
wrists." 125
The scout, Frank Grouard, said that Snow was unable to control his horse, and the animal
"ran away with him," straight for the Indians when the order was given to retreat. When the
hapless bugler was close to the warriors, he was finally able to turn his horse, but he was shot
through both wrists. He had lost the ability to use his hands which were simply "dangling" from
his arms. Snow called for help, and Grouard came to his aid. The scout got close to the Snow's
mount, but he could not grab the reins. He finally struck the horse on the head which caused the
animal to hesitate, and the wounded man finally threw himself off the mount. 126 Elmer A. Snow
was crippled for the rest of his life, but he won the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions
that day. This was the highest award for military courage in the United States. The citation for
his honor reads, "Bravery in action; was wounded in both arms." 127 While trumpeter Snow was
courageous, he might have owed his medal to the nature of his wounds as much as to his valor.
While the soldiers had held their positions, some Indians had advanced unexpectedly
through a ravine to the left and rear of the soldiers. They had reached the spring where General
Crook was resting when he heard the first shots of the battle. A Shoshone boy had accompanied
the command, and when the engagement began, he asked a chief for permission go back to the
spring and paint his face to be ready to enter his first battle. The Sioux found him there and "shot
him through the back and killed him, taking his scalp from the nape of the neck to the forehead,
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leaving his entire skull ghastly and white. " 128 A young Sioux boy also died at about the same
time. The child followed one of the warriors into the conflict, but he missed a turn in the
confusion of battle, and he went too far ahead of the others. He was unable to flee, and the Indian
scouts with the army captured and killed him. 129
General Crook saw that his command was under attack by numerous and aggressive
adversaries, and he responded with bold tactics. The General could have concentrated his forces
in a restricted area to make any assaults against his position hopeless because his troops could
concentrate their fire on any attack by the Indians, but he decided to spread his units far apart. He
clearly thought that deploying the soldiers on a lengthy front would allow him to hold his
positions, while giving him the ability of aiming damaging attacks against the Indians. Crook
never fully realized that this was a dangerous tactic. His men were deployed over three miles,
which meant that they could not concentrate as much firepower against their adversaries, and they
would be slow to support each other in the case of emergencies. Much of the battle was actually
separate engagements spread over large distances in which Crooks troops fought with little
support from the other groups .
Additionally, General Crook and his men also used tactics that favored their enemies. The
Sioux and Cheyenne warriors had no interest in holding positions, and the army' s attempt to take
and hold various hills and ridges had little impact in the outcome of the fighting. Thunder Hawk,
a warrior with the Sioux, described how the Indians used the aggressiveness of the soldiers to the
Indians' advantage. He stated that groups of warriors would often attack in succession, after
luring the cavalry into a dangerous situation. "As the first group attacked the foremost van of the
enemy another was held in check, and, as soon as the leading body had become engaged, a second
group was dispatched from a right angle. The troops were now being pressed on both sides and
with telling blows." A third group of warriors would then be deployed against the troops. "While
these two attacks were being stressed with savage fury, the third, and last group was released,
arriving from the left flank , [which] succeeded in almost encircling the detachment." At that
point, the soldiers were in a dangerous position and had to retreat. 130
Crook and many of his officers were experienced Indian fighters who clearly understood
the Indian tactics of luring the soldiers into a position where a counterattack would be most
effective. But the army waged the entire battle in a manner that gave the warriors the greatest
advantage. The army leadership should have known better, and they gave needless advantages to
the warriors. The General and his officers were fools who recklessly exposed their men to
unnecessary risks that endangered the command and resulted in avoidable casualties.
Wooden Leg, a Cheyenne, assessed the overall nature of the fighting very well, and he
stated that the tactics of the warriors were used during the entire battle. "Until the sun went far
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toward the west there were charges back and forth . Our Indians fought and ran away, fought and
ran away. The soldiers and their Indian scouts did the same. Sometimes we chased them,
sometimes they chased us ." 131
The Battle of the Rosebud: Intense Fighting on the Left
The battle soon became fully engaged up and down the line, and Lieutenant James Foster
described the din of battle as "a continuous rattle. " Five companies of cavalry under the
command of Colonel William B . Royall, Crook's second in command, rode to secure the left
flank. Company I under Captain William H. Andrews was on the far left of Royall ' s men, and
Lieutenant Foster' s platoon controlled the left side of the company. In this position, Foster' s men
were the key to securing that entire section of the line, and they took aggressive action.
" Sounding the charge, the gallant fellows dashed forward" driving the Sioux before them. The
troopers " pressed on under a galling fire and drove the enemy from a strong position among some
rocks." The warriors, "although superior in force, position, and arms, broke before the gallant
little party and were driven pell-mell from the ridge." The troopers charged firing their pistols,
and they advanced over two more ridges.132
At this point, this small group of men were well ahead of their lines, and they were in
danger of being surrounded and killed . Foster ordered his men to fall back, but they were still
under heavy fire. The Sioux seemed to fire in a "sweeping discharge" or volley that came from
the "the left and right" simultaneously. The shots wounded Private Charles Stuart "through the
hand and forearm and Private [James] O'Brien in the arm." 133 Private Phineas Towne was very
impressed with the size of the Sioux forces . "I never saw so great a body of Indians in one place
as I saw at that time, and I have seen a great many Indians in my time." There were so many that
"it seemed that if one Indian was shot five were there to take his place." 134
The situation of the men with Lieutenant Foster became more serious when their horses
got loose and "galloped madly away. " This left the "troopers at the mercy of the savage Sioux."
The group of men were unable to retrieve additional bullets because their mounts had ran away
with the extra cartridge boxes in their saddle pouches, and the soldiers soon ran out of
ammunition. The men, led by Sergeant David Marshall had no recourse but to use their rifles as
clubs, and they "fought bravely to the last. " Apparently, one young recruit had an "insane idea of
surrender." If so, he was quite foolish because he could expect torture and death if he were
captured. He "calmly gave up his carbine, handing it to the nearest Sioux, and was brained
instead by a blow from its butt." In a brief period of time, "five men fell dead and as many more
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were wounded ." 135
One of these men who fell was Sergeant David Marshall, who had been shot through the
face and was seriously wounded. When Private Towne was retreating, he came upon three
troopers carrying Marshall, Towne glanced behind him, saw the warriors approaching, and called
to the others, "Quick, here they come!" The men dropped the sergeant and ran to their horses to
save their lives. Bravely, Marshall told Towne to flee as well, "Save yourself if you can, because I
am dying. Don' t stay with me." Both men were in Company F, and the private refused to
abandon his friend . He said, "Dave, old boy, I am going to stay right here with you and will not
desert you. " Towne did the best he could, "Grasping him with all my strength, I carried my
comrade." The Private' s effort proved futile because he finally realized, "it was useless to carry
him any further, for he was dead ." 136 Despite his best efforts, the Towne had been unable to save
his friend . At least, Sergeant Marshall did not have to die alone. Even though the Private never
received the Congressional Medal of Honor- an accolade he richly deserved -for risking his life to
rescue his friend, his sacrifice was still one of the most courageous and merciful acts of the entire
battle.
Seeing he could do nothing further for the dead man, the Private then laid the corpse
down and attempted to escape, but he was soon surrounded by the "most murderous looking
Indians I ever saw." The Indians had Towne badly outnumbered, and they soon subdued him. In
an instant, they took his rifle and tossed a lasso over his head which fell to his ankles. They soon
tightened it around his feet. The Private was helpless, and "I struggled and fought in vain, until I
was struck on the head with something which rendered me unconscious and caused me to fall. As
I went down a bullet struck me in the body." Towne had been shot in the abdomen. He soon
regained his senses only to realize that he was being dragged over the ground behind an Indian
pony. A group of cavalrymen charged the warriors and saved Towne either from being dragged
to death or taken away to be tortured.137
Private Towne' s fate was far different from Private Richard Bennett who was captured.
Private Bennet "was badly wounded and lay hid in the rocks as the Sioux charged by." The
unfortunate soldier mistook these Indians for friendly Crow scouts, and he called out to them for
aid . The Sioux "cut him to pieces with their long-handled (eight foot) tomahawks and lances." 138
According to Private Towne, Bennet was "completely cut to pieces. His remains were buried in a
grain sack." 139 Sergeant Marshall ' s corpse was retrieved by a small group of men led by Private
Gerold J. O'Grady, who charged through a "shower of bullets" to retrieve the body and keep if
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from mutilation.140
White Shield may have been the man who killed Sergeant Marshall. The warrior saw a
trooper on horseback, and he fired when the soldier turned his head to give an order. The bullet
entered the man' s head "just over the eyebrow." The warrior thought he had killed an officer, but
no cavalry officer died that day. White Shield might have confused the Sergeant' s insignia with
that of an officer. The Indian later found the corpse of this soldier he had killed, and he took the
revolver from the dead man.14 1
Other soldiers fell in the battle. Sergeant William W. Allen' s horse was shot twice, the
animal fell , and he was forced to fight on foot. He was unable to flee and bravely turned to face
his enemies rather than run, "determined to sell his life as dearly as possible. He stood firing his
rifle until two Sioux came up to him on opposite sides and shot him down ." The badly wounded
man still tried to resist, and he tried to draw his pistol, but a warrior "struck the poor fellow over
the ear, thus ending the unequal contest." Sergeant Groesch was badly wounded, and he lay on
the ground nearby, but he was saved from death by the arrival of the friendly Crows and
Shoshones who took him back to the aid station.142
When his men reached the other companies on the left flank, Lieutenant Faster estimated
that they were assailed by fi ve to seven hundred Indians, and shots were corning from the left and
rear, which bothered some of the troopers who started to withdraw. The "officer in charge,"
explained to his men the severity of the situation and stated, "Men we must hold the hill ." "All
right, sir," replied one of his soldiers, "if you say so, we' ll hold it till hell freezes over." They then
returned to the fight and held the ground .143
Foster described the scene, no doubt with some exaggeration, as the "hottest encounter
that had ever taken place between Indians and soldiers. " The fighting intensified, and "the affair
now became serious." The officers realized that the soldiers needed to keep enough ammunition
to make sure they had sufficient for any emergency. The leaders told the troopers "to fire only
when they had a fair assurance of hitting their man." When the Indians attacked, "the men
received them steadily and, pouring in volley after volley, drove them back in confusion." The
battle seemed to increase in fury, and "the firing was now terrific, the repeating rifles used by the
Indians enabling them to make it one continuous volley." 144
The action of the day had reduced the numbers of troopers in the companies considerably.
The men had dismounted to fire more accurately at their foes, but one out of four men had to hold
the horses. Some soldiers were wounded and others were assigned to bring them to the aid
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station. At the critical moment, only seventy men were in their position to await the "onslaught of
the enemy, who were now pouring in a rolling, continuous fire from rocks, ravines, and cover."
The officers, including Foster and Captain Guy V. Henry, stayed on their horses "rode up and
down the line, encouraging the men and cautioning them to waste no ammunition, but wait for the
charge." The warriors yelled what sounded like, "Yip! Yip! Hi-Yah! , Hi-Yah," and dashed
toward the line. The soldiers took a few steps back, then regained their courage, returned to their
positions, and "poured a withering volley into the rascals, repulsing them with considerable loss."
But the soldiers were still taking casualties and the "gallant little line already too small, was
rapidly thinning." 145 At this critical point in the battle, Captain Henry was shot in the face and
badly wounded .
Henry was an experienced soldier who had a crippled hand because he suffered from
frostbite in the winter campaign of 1874-5 in the Black Hills. He was "unable to bend or close my
fingers" of his left hand for the rest of his life.146 In the fighting Captain Henry was hit, "I felt a
sharp sting as of being slapped in the face, and a blinding rush of blood to my head and eyes." He
later described the nature of his wound . " A bullet had struck me in the face, under my left eye,
passing through the upper part of my mouth, under the nose and out below the right eye. " 147
Finerty stated that the Captain "was struck by a bullet which passed through both cheek bones,
broke the bridge of his nose and destroyed the optic nerve in one eye." One of his men tried to
help him, but this trooper was also hit. Henry courageously stood his ground "temporarily
blinded as he was and throwing blood from his mouth by the handful. " The Captain managed to
remain on his horse for several minutes standing in front of the enemy all the time and calling to
his men, "On. Onl Charge." Finally, the brave man collapsed and fell to the ground . The Sioux
continued their advance over his prostrate body, but they were driven back by the soldiers, and
members of his command were finally able to him bring Henry safely to their lines.148
Frank Grouard reported that it was an Indian scout who rescued Captain Henry.
According to Grouard, the Captain was laying helpless on the ground as the Sioux pressed
forward . One of the Indian scouts, Yute John, ran to the fallen officer. The scout got off his
horse and defended the wounded man. All alone, he kept his adversaries at bay until the soldiers
started firing and drove the Sioux warriors away. Yute John then picked up Henry on his back
and carried him to safety. "If it had not been for the Indian (Yute John), Col. [Captain] Henry
would have been killed and scalped where he fell ." 149 The badly wounded man agreed, but he
gave another name for the heroic man who saved his life, "had it not been for Washakie, chief of
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the Shoshones, fighting over my body, my scalp would have been lifted," and he would have been
killed . 150
While Captain Henry lay in agony behind the lines, the battle for the hill continued. As
Lieutenant Foster described, " Again the Sioux advanced." The warriors charged the right of the
army' s line and kept up a "scorching enfilading fire ." The soldiers were waiting for
reinforcements that never arrived, "the gallant little band fought on with a desperate courage
hardly to be believed if not actually seen." One trooper thought they could hold out only as long
as they had ammunition, and he said to another man, "Jack, it's only a question of cartridges." An
officer agreed about the gravity of the situation and admonished the soldiers to go down fighting,
"Well I guess we' re done for. Better die right here, facing the rascals, than give way an inch, and
go down with a lance in the back further to the rear." 151
Sergeant John Henry Shingle had been given command of the detachment holding the
horses behind the front. When he saw some of the men in the battle line waver, break ranks, and
turn to flee, he mounted a horse and rushed forward to rally the men at this critical juncture in the
battle. He yelled in a huge voice, "Face them, men! On them, face them! " 152 For his valor that
day, Shingle was given the Congressional Medal of Honor. His courage and determination rallied
the men who returned to the fight and held their positions. Sergeant Joseph Robinson also earned
the Medal of Honor in the action . His citation stated he won the award for, "Discharging his
duties while in charge of the skirmish line under fire with judgment and great coolness and
brought up the lead horses at a critical moment. " 153
Despite the courage of the cavalrymen on the left in holding their position, an attack by
the infantry probably decided this part of the engagement. The foot soldiers had been holding the
center of the line for hours, and they finally rushed to help the men on the left. Captain T. B.
Burrowes, and Captain Andrew S. Burt led their companies in driving off the Sioux. The men
" moved forward at double time and on reaching the ridge stopped the Indians quickly and
decisively without loss on our part." The warriors withdrew and the army held the hills.154
As the battle raged, Captain Henry was taken to the rear area "to have my wound
dressed." Although his wounds were severe, the Captain wanted to return to the fight, but "the
Surgeon forbid me doing so." 155 Finerty, the news reporter, saw Henry at the aid station, "lying
on a blanket, his face covered with a bloody cloth, around which the summer flies were buzzing
fiercely. " The men did their best to help the wounded officer. One soldier kept the Captain' s
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horse near him, so the animal blocked the sunlight because there was "no other shade in the
neighborhood. " When the reporter tried to comfort him, Henry firmly replied, "It is nothing. For
this are we soldiers! " The Captain even tried to recruit Finerty to join the service, and he gave the
reporter "the honor of advising me to join the army! " 156
Captain Anson Mills came behind the lines to visit his wounded men. When Captain
Henry heard his voice, the wounded man called to him. Mills did not know his old friend had
been hit and was surprised to see Henry with "his breast all covered with clotted blood, his eyes
swollen so he could not see." Mills asked, "Henry, are you badly wounded?" The injured man
replied, "The doctors have just told me that I must die, but I will not. " Mills thought that nine out
often men would have died from such wounds, but, surprisingly, Henry survived.157 Even though
he remained blind in one eye, he continued his military career. He belatedly received the
Congressional Medal of Honor in 1893 for his courage at the Battle of Cold Harbor in 1864
during the American Civil War. Henry also fought in the war with Spain in 1898, became a
brigadier general, served briefly as military governor of Puerto Rico, and died in 1899.158
Captain Henry was not the only man suffering from wounds who impressed Finerty. The
hospital was located under some trees near the stream, and the wounded soldiers and Indian
scouts were brought there for treatment. "Most of the injured men bore their sufferings stoically
enough, but an occasion groan or half-smothered shriek would tell where the knife, or the probe,
had struck an exposed nerve." Finerty was even more impressed with the conduct of the scouts.
"The Indian wounded, some of them desperate cases, gave no indication of feeling, but submitted
to be operated upon with the grim stolidity of their race." 159
The Indians' Battle
Many of the whites continued to observe the Indian tactics with admiration. Robert E.
Strahorn stated that they did much of their fighting from horseback. "Some of the most reckless
feats of equestrianism imaginable were performed by them within range of the broadsides of an
entire company." Often one or two of the warriors would dash from behind the cover of the
rocks. They would nearly tumble down the slope of the hills to take a shot or two at their
adversaries and then disappear "like a flash" despite the volleys fired at them. One of the reckless
foes pressed too close to the cavalrymen and was in danger of being killed . While his pony was
running at full speed, the resourceful warrior took out his Bowie knife, cut the strap holding the
saddle on his horse, and "thus unencumbered made his escape." These men also "repeatedly
courted death by endeavoring to secure the bodies of their own dead ." 160
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Ben Arnold was a messenger for the army, and he "was not under strict military discipline
and was not expected to fight." Even though he did not participated in the battle, Arnold was in a
position to observe much of the combat. He saw a daring Sioux warrior "who seemed to have a
charmed life." This man would skip back and forth taking advantage of whatever protection the
ground allowed him. When the soldiers advanced close to him he kept firing at them. The army
skirmishers finally hit the warrior, and he fell wounded, but he kept fighting . "He sat up and kept
pouring in his fire, determined to die selling his life dearly." Finally, when the front rack of the
soldiers came within easy shooting distance from him, the orders were given to the troops, "Halt!
Take aim! Fire! " The wounded Indian fell dead, riddled with bullets.16 1
A group of about a dozen Sioux warriors fell back when they were attacked by larger
numbers of Crow scouts. One of the Sioux warriors fired his gun at the advancing Crows until
the rifle' s breech broke, and the weapon became useless. Apparently, the hapless warrior tried to
inspire his comrades. He stood on a rock, with his arms extended, and began to sing his death
chant. He stated his name, " I, Yellow Ear Rings," and he sang, "I love these hills and valleys, My
friends are in the number as grass. But now I am as nothing. My friends, I am leaving you. You
may even now count me dead ." His companions were so impressed that they called to him,
"Yellow Ear Rings, you are too brave to die . We will not let you die. If you are to die, we shall
also die with you. " The Sioux warriors then staged an impressive counterattack, pushed the
scouts back, and rescued their friend. The courage of Yellow Ear Rings not only saved his life
but also inspired his companions to fight harder. 162
The battle raged over a such large distance, and there were so many Indians engaged in
the fighting, that no one leader could possibly have directed all the action. But Crazy Horse was
still a prominent chief, and many of the Sioux near him looked to him for guidance. After the
initial charge by the Sioux and Cheyenne, the cavalry and their Indian scouts counterattacked and
pushed the warriors back. Many of the warriors were on the verge of running away. At this
critical junction, Crazy Horse called to his men, "Hold on, my friends! Be strong! Remember the
helpless ones at home! " He led by example. He held his rifle high and rode toward the soldiers
shouting, "This is a good day to die! " He also yelled what the famous Sioux war cry, "Hoka
hey!" which means "Hurry! Hurry! " or "Let's go! " 163 Crazy Horse, Bad Heart Bull, Black Deer,
Kicking Bear, and Good Weasel "rallied the Sioux, turned the charge, and got the soldiers on the
run. " These men had been able to inspire the Indians to stay in the battle and to continue the
fight. Short Buffalo gave his opinion of the war chiefs leadership in the battle, "Crazy Horse
used good judgment in this Rosebud fight. " 164
Iron Hawk was a Hunkpapa Sioux, and he was fourteen years old the summer of the
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battle, but he "was a big boy," so he participated in the fight. He rode to the location of the
engagement with a war party of forty men. When they arrived, the battle was raging, and "the
Crows were right among us. " The fighting was at close quarters and the two sides were "all
mixed up ." There were so many enemy targets nearby that Iron Hawk believed that he must have
killed someone. "The way it was you couldn' t keep from killing somebody if you didn' t get
killed, and I am still alive." There was a Sioux warrior named Without-a-Tepee nearby, and a
large Crow scout pulled him off his horse. The two men disappeared in the melee. The young
warrior saw his friend, Sitting Eagle, fighting hand-to-hand with another Crow scout, and it was
the scout who fell. Iron Hawk survived because he fled. "I ran for my life, because we could not
fight all those Crows and the soldiers too, and I was scared." All the warriors ran, but then Iron
Hawk heard the rallying cries that the Sioux were using so frequently that day, "Take courage!
This is a good day to die! Think of the children and the helpless at home! " The men all yelled
"Hoka heyl" and turned on their adversaries. This time the cavalry fled .
During the battle, Iron Hawk saw some smoke and went to investigate. He found three
Sioux eating a buffalo which they had killed. They invited him to eat, and the warriors dined for a
long time while the battle raged . Finally, a Sioux man came to them who had obviously been
involved in the fighting because blood and dirt covered his face . He was angry when he saw the
others resting and eating during the engagement. He said, "What are you doing here? We' re
fighting! All you think of is to eat! Why don't you think about the helpless ones at home? Come
make haste! We have got to stand our ground! " Iron Hawk was ashamed, and he returned to the
battle.165
Lazy White Bull was a Sioux warrior. He cared little for singing war songs, but he
composed one and sang it when he was advancing toward the soldiers. "Friends, try your best.II
do not wish my father to be ashamed ./Because he is a chief" In one of the attacks, Lazy White
Bull tried to ride in front of the other warriors and led the advance. When he was finally in front,
he came face to face with a Shoshone scout who was wielding a repeating rifle. The Indian scout
rode directly for Lazy White Bull, and the Shoshone fired his weapon twice, but he missed each
time. The Sioux warrior then fired twice and put two bullets in the right shoulder of the scout's
horse. The animal went down, and the Shoshone ran. Lazy White Bull chased the man and shot
him in the right leg. The Sioux warrior then retreated . This was long considered one of Lazy
White Bull' s bravest deeds. Many years later, in the 1920s, the President of the United States,
Calvin Coolidge, visited the Indian reservation in South Dakota. Lazy White Bull gave an address
to welcome the President, and the warrior was introduced as, "The Man Who Lamed the
Shoshone." 166
Lazy White Bull stated that some of his close friends died that day including Little Crow,
Black Bird, Sitting Bear, and Little Wolf The number of dead would have probably been higher
except for Lazy White Bull' s courage in saving two men . When Hawk Soldier' s horse was shot,
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Lazy White Bull saved the warrior by carrying him to safety. In another incident, a Indian' s horse
was shot out from under him. The animal fell on the rider and pinned him to the ground because
his leg was caught under the pony. Lazy White Bull bravely ran forward and protected the
defenseless warrior until he could free his leg and escape.167
There were about two hundred Cheyenne warriors in the battle. While the battle was
quite fluid, and many Indians fought against more than one segment of the soldiers' line, the
Cheyenne probably did most of their fighting on the army' s left flank. Wooden Leg was a
Northern Cheyenne who was then eighteen years old. When the news of the army' s approach
reached his camp, the old men admonished the youths to remain there and allow the more mature
men to fight. "Young men, leave the soldiers alone unless they attack us." But when night fell,
the young warriors slipped away. They rode all night long and arrived on the scene of action
having slept little and with tired horses, but they were ready to fight. Early in the battle, one
young man "charged too far" and got cut off by the Indian scouts with the army. They shot his
horse, but Wooden Leg and other Cheyenne drove back his pursuers. Bravely, Wooden Leg
pulled up the man onto the back of his horse, and the two men made their escape.168
A group of Cheyenne advanced too far against their adversaries, and they were nearly cut
off from the other warriors. Their situation was dangerous because Indian scouts were shooting
down hill at them, and the soldiers were nearly blocking their only avenue of retreat. The
warriors decided to flee for safety, but they thought it best to run one at a time. As Two Moons
advised, "Don' t all run together- one at a time! " When one ran half the distance to safety, another
man would start. Limpy, a crippled man, went last. His horse was shot immediately, and it
started kicking and bucking. Soon Limpy fell to the ground . Two Moons rode back, and Limpy
jumped onto the back of the horse. The fire was so intense that Two Moons later said he could
almost feel the bullets touching his head. Limpy later told John Stands in Timber about the fear
and excitement he felt when running for his life. "When you are in a tight pinch like that it seems
like you don' t have no feelings . It seems like your feet don 't even touch the ground ." I 69
Jack Red Cloud was the son of the Sioux Chief, Red Cloud, and the young man was
wearing a war bonnet in battle. His horse was killed, and it was customary for an Indian warrior
to take the bridle off the dead horse to demonstrate his courage and "to show how cool he could
conduct himself " But Jack Red Cloud forgot any display of manliness, and he ran for his life.
Three Crow scouts on horseback soon overtook him and "lashed him with their pony whips and
jerked off and kept his war bonnet." His pursuers teased him. They told him he was only a boy
and should not wear such a headdress. The young man, who was only eighteen years of age,
"was crying and asking mercy from the Crows." The Crows showed him compassion and let him
live. I 70
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White Wolf had a lever-action repeating rifle. The rapid-fire weapon was a big advantage
in combat, but it was also very dangerous to the man who wielded it, and it had to be handled
carefully. He rode into battle with the gun in a scabbard on his left side. When he pulled it out,
the rifle accidentally discharged. The bullet went through his left leg and broke his thigh bone.
He survived the accident, but he limped for the rest of his life.171
White Shield saw a soldier who was having trouble getting on his horse. The warrior rode
between him and his horse to knock the reins out of the trooper' s hands. The Indian then killed
his adversary. Scabby Island [Eyelid?]saw another soldier fall off his horse. The warrior rode
forward and tried to strike the man on the ground with his whip . The trooper caught the whip in
his hand and pulled the Indian off his horse. Each man survived unhurt . Two Moon thought that
he would die in the battle when he had to "leave his horse and run off on foot. " The situation was
very dangerous because "the bullets were flying pretty thick and were knocking up the dirt all
about him. " White Shield came to his rescue when he rode to the desperate man and told him to
jump on the horse beside him. When this animal became too tired to carry its load, the men had
to look for another means of escape. Contrary Belly then came forward riding one horse and
leading another. Two Moon jumped on the pony and finally made good his escape.172
The most celebrated act of courage among the Cheyenne that day was not performed by a
warrior but by a woman. Buffalo Calf Road Woman, the sister of Comes in Sight, accompanied
her brother when he marched to fight the soldiers. Showing great courage, Comes in Sight had
charged the army many times, and, as he rode up and down in front of the enemy, his horse took a
bullet and fell . White Elk was going in the wrong direction when Comes in Sight fell , and the
warrior was in a poor position to come to the aid of the dismounted man. Then White Elk saw
Buffalo Calf Road•Woman ride to help her brother. She passed him, so when she returned, she
would be riding the animal in the direction of the Indians. Comes in Sight jumped on the back of
her horse, and they escaped. This act of courage was so famous among the Cheyenne that they
always referred to the battle by the name, "Where the girl saved her brother." 173
The Cheyenne gave detailed accounts of how one of their warriors died that day. The
various sources list his name as either Sunrise, Black Sun, or Scabby. He will be referred to as
Sunrise in this account. The warrior took a long time to prepare for battle, and he covered
himself with yellow paint. This was very dangerous because the soldiers would clearly notice
such a conspicuous man, and the troopers would certainly direct much of their fire at such a
tempting target. Apparently, Sunrise had a death wish or a premonition that he was going to die
because he sang these words when he went into battle, "I do not wish to be an old man. This day
is mine to die." 174 Initially, the warrior seemed to have a charmed life because the soldiers shot at
him many times but missed . "Finally one of them got behind him and shot him through the
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body." 175 Sunrise was not killed instantly, but he was unable to move as he lay on the ground.
Other Indians brought him off the battlefield, and they attempted to treat his wounds, but he had
been shot through the bowls, and his death was only a matter of time. The man was very thirsty,
but no one would give him anything to drink because they knew it would kill him. Finally, Sunrise
said, "If I don 't drink I will die anyhow. If I drink now and die, the sooner the better." The
others finally gave him some water, and he died soon after.176
Decision on the Right Flank
While the battle was hotly contended on General Crook ' s left, the center of his line held
firm . Early in the contest, the General had wisely placed the infantry in this critical position.
These men wielded the longer-barreled infantry rifle that had a longer range and greater accuracy
than did the cavalry carbines. The infantry laid down on the ground to fire their weapons, making
their shots more accurate and providing smaller targets for their enemies. These soldiers kept
their adversaries at a distance, and their skill in battle tended to anchor the entire line. The center
was also bolstered by Tom Moore and his sharpshooters. These men came from the pack train,
and Crook ordered them to advance four hundred yards. In that position, they were supposed to
"pick off as many hostile chiefs as possible and also make the best impression upon the flanks of
any charging parties which might attempt to pass on either side of that promontory." These men
did good work, and their skill, cheerfulness, and courage impressed Lieutenant Bourke who
stated they "had no idea what the word, ' nerves' meant. " 177
The fighting on the right was often intense, and the Sioux and cavalry charged back and
forth against each other. In one such encounter Sergeant John van Mall, Company A in Mills
battalion, "a brave and gigantic soldier," ran forward to attack with the cavalry. But he was on
foot, and he was left when the men on horseback withdrew. Soon, "A dozen Sioux dashed at
him. " While a few cavalrymen rode forward to try to save the soldier, who was in grave danger,
"one small misshapen Crow warrior mounted on a fleet pony outstripped all others." The Indian
scout, Humpy, "dashed boldly among the Sioux ... seized the big Sergeant by the shoulder and
motioned him to jump up behind." Apparently, the Sioux were too surprised to react rapidly, and
the two men made good their escape. The troopers seemed to revel in the deed much like it had
been an athletic contest, and "the whole line of our battalion cheered Humpy and van Mall as they
passed us on the home stretch." 178
General Crook believed he could turn the tide on his adversaries by offensive action. The
Sioux and Cheyenne had found his command early in the morning, and the Indians were showing
uncommon skill and aggressiveness . He believed that the Indian village must be nearby, and he
thought he could distract his enemies by striking at their encampment. When the battle seemed to
be less intense, Crook decided to make his move, and he could use the opportunity "to follow the
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Indians" and strike at their homes.179 If indeed there was a lull in the battle at that point, the other
accounts failed to mention it. Rather than taking advantage of a break in combat, Crook might
have been reacting to his own anxiety. His horse had been shot out from under him during the
battle, he had gained no advantage in several hours of combat, and he was probably becoming
more desperate to find a way to turn the tide on his enemies.180
At about 12:30 PM, the General came to Captain Anson Mills and ordered him to take his
battalion which consisted of companies A, E, and M and strike the Indian camp. Crook explained
that Mills' troops would be followed by five more companies under Captain Henry Noyes. In
fact, the General was planning to shift his entire command to strike at the target, and Crook
informed Mills that "he had been reliably informed" that the village "was about six miles down the
canyon." 181 He said, "it is time to stop this skirmishing .... You must take your battalion and go
for their village away down the canyon." 182 When the General spoke to the scout, Frank
Grouard, he sounded less positive on the location of the village. "I am going to move down
Rosebud Canyon and I want you to go, with two battalions, as far as you can handle the defile
and find out whether the village is at the other end of the canyon or not." 183
This maneuver was based more on wishful thinking than on sound judgement. Crook had
no means to knowing where the Indian village was located, and he could not know it was nearby.
He probably thought that the encampment must be within easy reach for his Indian adversaries to
have found him so rapidly and engaged him so resolutely. In actuality, the camp was perhaps
twenty-five miles away and could only be reached by many hours of hard riding even if he knew
where it was. Logically, the camp of the Cheyenne and Sioux would be located on a stream, and
the General thought it should be on the Rosebud River. Crook did not know the location of the
village, and redeploying his forces made no sense. In effect, he was dividing his forces in the face
of an aggressive enemy and a numerically superior enemy. Once his forces were divided, the
hostile Indians could destroy them one at a time. The maneuver was foolish, and it invited
disaster.
When Captain Mills and his men moved away, their Indian adversaries seemed to think
they were retreating and became more bold, "and fairly hailed bullets after us wounding several
soldiers." One of these men was a trooper named Harold who received an unusual wound.
When he was aiming his rifle, a bullet struck the barrel of the weapon and flew the length of the
weapon to lodge beneath the skin in the man' s neck. As the column entered the canyon, Sioux
warriors tried to block their entrance, but they were dislodged by a daring charge by Company E
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under Captain Alexander Sutorius and Lieutenant Adolphus von Leuttwitz.184
The Sioux and Cheyenne watched Captain Mills and his men when they advanced, but
they kept their distance. The troopers marched six miles, and Mills was determined to follow the
valley until they arrived at the village and "hold it until he [Crook] came to my support with the
rest of the command." The Captain followed his orders until he " reached the vicinity of the
village." But he had not seen or located the village, and the Captain was engaged in wishful
thinking. Before the column got even further separated from Crook' s command, Mills heard a
"voice calling him to halt ." Captain Azor Nickerson had ridden rapidly with new orders from
Crook to return. Mills was very surprised, and he asked the other officer, "Are you sure he wants
me to go back?" Nickerson replied that the orders were correct. 185
The expedition by Anson Mills and his men down the Rosebud River remains one of the
most controversial aspects of the battle because no one knows if the Indians were trying to entrap
the army in the canyon. The scout, Frank Grouard, accompanied the movement, and he was
convinced that their Indian adversaries had tried to ambush the army. "They wanted to draw the
entire command down into this canyon and massacre every soul of it. " He stated that he
understood the plan when he rode into the defile. "The canyon rose to a heigh of one thousand
feet on both sides of us. The Indians had all of this fortified ." 186 The scout exaggerated the height
of the sides of the canyon, but the high terrain could have given the Indian adversaries a distinct
advantage.
Finerty described the surroundings through which the army marched, "the bluffs on both
sides of the ravine were thickly covered with rocks and fir trees, thus affording ample protection
to an enemy and making it impossible for our cavalry to act as flankers ." He also had misgivings,
and he believed that in any engagement "all the advantage would be on the side of the savages. "
He further speculated that an Indian attack in that area could have led to the death of all the
soldiers. 187 According to Grouard, Nickerson ' s timely arrival with orders to withdraw saved the
entire command.188
Captain Mills ordered his men to return by a different route than the advance. He
probably thought that his Indian adversaries might have been waiting for him to retreat back up
the canyon, and returning by a different route could fool any attempt to surprise the army. When
he came to gentler slope in the canyon, "I found I could climb the rocks and get out." He led his
command by a wide route that brought him upon the flank of the Sioux who were fighting on
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Crook' s right side. This caused the warriors to flee. 189
After a ride of two hours, Mills and his men arrived back with the main column at about
2:30 PM. The Captain asked the General for an explanation of why the senior officer had ordered
the withdrawal. Mill said, "I never saw a man more dejected," when Crook gave his answer. The
General gave an explanation, "I found it a more serious engagement than I thought. We have lost
about fifty killed and wounded, and the doctors refused to remain with the wounded unless I left
the infantry and one of the squadrons [battalions] with them." In effect, the doctors had
requested that at least one third of the command be on hand to protect them and the wounded .
Crook admitted, "I knew I could not keep my promise to support you with the remainder of the
force ." 190
Frank Grouard believed that he had dissuaded Crook from taking his entire command into
an ambush in the canyon. When the General stated he was taking his complete force in an effort
to find and attack the village, Grouard protested, "You can't go through the canyon . . .. They
will kill your whole command if you attempt to go through there." Crook did not believe this,
and he "laughed quietly" at the suggestion. Grouard finally tried to convince the General that his
command had too little ammunition to support the attack. When Crook learned that his men only
had ten cartridges each, he realized that "he would have to wait until he go more ammunition
from the wagons before taking the offensive." This saved the command from being destroyed. 19 1
Crook' s attempt to dictate the terms of the battle had failed, and it was the Sioux and
Cheyenne who started the engagement and ended it as well . They left at about the same time as
the return of Anson Mills and his men, but the arrival of this column was probably not the reason
for the Indian withdrawal. Many of the warriors had slept little the night before, and they had
gone into battle with little food and on tired horses. After about six hours of combat, the Indians
were simply exhausted, and they left.
While the battle had ended, unfortunately, the killing was not yet over, because one more
Indian was killed the day after the fight. The Crow scouts were on Crook's right flank, when they
heard someone calling in the Sioux language, "Mini! Mini! " This was a cry for water. The
Crows found a badly-wounded "Cheyenne whose eyes had been shot out in the beginning of the
battle." He had crawled away from the fighting and was hiding among some rocks. He had heard
the Crows talking and had mistaken them for Sioux warriors. The scouts were in no mood to be
compassionate, and "The Crows cut him limb from limb and ripped off his scalp." 192 In his diary,
written shortly after the battle, Bourke was more explicit. "My informant told me they cut off the
legs at the knees, the arms at the elbows, broke open the skull and scattered the brains on the
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ground . This is the manner of treatment all Indians pursue towards their enemy. " 193
After the Cheyenne and Sioux had withdrawn that afternoon, Crook decided not to
pursue. He had failed to locate the enemy village, and the General knew that he still faced a
formidable foe who could renew the battle. His men had lost their optimism for the campaign,
confidence was low, and they were exhausted from the fighting . The army had expended much
of its ammunition, and Crook believed he could not continue to advance. He needed
reinforcements to meet the Indians again, and he also required more supplies in food and
ammunition. The General decided he must abandon any offensive operations, and he ordered his
men to retreat the following day.
The newspaper reporter, Finerty, summed up the situation well, "General Crook decided
that evening to retire on his base of supplies- the wagon train- with his wounded, in view of the
fact that his rations were almost used up and that his ammunition had run pretty low. He was also
convinced that all chance of surprising the Sioux camp was over for the present, and perhaps he
felt that even if it could be surprised his small force would be unequal to the task of carrying it by
storm. The Indians had shown themselves good fighters, and he shrewdly calculated that his men
had been opposed to only a part of the well-armed warriors actually in the field ." 194 Finerty also
confirmed that the soldiers had shot a large number of bullets, and he stated that they "had fired
about 25 ,000 rounds of ammunition ." He observed that "it often takes an immense amount of
lead to send even one Indian to the happy hunting grounds." 195
The Dead and Wounded
In his official report Crook stated, "Our casualties during the action, were 10 killed
including one Indian Scout, and 21 wounded, including Captain Guy V. Henry." He added that
he could not properly estimated the losses suffered by his enemies, but he sated that "thirteen of
their dead bodies being left in close proximity to our lines. " Curiously, Crook gave a different
number of fatalities in his autobiography. "We lost over a dozen men killed and a good many
wounded ." 196 These totals were different from the statement Crook made to Captain Mills
because the General said, "We have lost about fifty killed and wounded ." Finerty agreed with
this number and stated, "Our losses, including the friendly Indians, amounted to about fifty. " 197
Lieutenant Bourke wrote shortly after the battle, "the number of casualties of all kinds reported is
fifty-seven, including (10) killed outright, (4) mortally wounded, and many ofno significance." 198
T. B. MacMillan was a newspaper reporter with the army, and he reported, "We lost 10 killed, 4
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mortally wounded, l officer and l O men dangerously wounded and about 30 slightly wounded .
Lost 16 horses that were shot, and 7 carbines." 199
The army officers may have had good reason to minimize their casualties, so the extent of
their losses would not be known. Ben Arnold was a messenger with the army, and he had no
motive to falsify reports. He stated that the Sioux "succeeded in killing thirteen soldiers, five
Crows, and seven or eight Shoshones." 200 These numbers appear to be more believable that some
of the official reports, which almost always state that only one Indian scout was killed. The Crow
and Shoshone were heavily engaged at the most critical juncture of the battle, and they likely
suffered the greatest losses.
Frank Grouard also had no military reputation to protect, and he had fewer reasons to
falsify reports. His numbers of casualties were much higher than the other reports. "To sum up
the battle, there were twenty-eight soldiers killed and fifty-six wounded. One of the Indian scouts
was killed and three of them wounded. On the Indian [Sioux and Cheyenne] side, there were
thirteen of them killed that I know of " 20 1 The most thorough history of the campaign was written
by J. W. Vaughn, and he indicated that the government might have destroyed important
documents relating to casualties. The official reports for the three companies, which reportedly
suffered the most losses in battle, were missing from the U.S . National Archives. Additionally,
Vaughn has observed, " It seems incredible that all these men could have fought for six hours with
only the small number killed as stated in the official report. The statement of Grouard would
appear to be closer to the truth." 202
The number of Sioux and Cheyenne who were killed in the battle may never be known
with accuracy. The soldiers could only be sure that thirteen of the enemy had been killed because
the Indian scouts had taken that number of scalps from their dead adversaries. As Finerty
described, the Sioux and Cheyenne "picked up their wounded, all but thirteen of their dead, and
broke away to the northwest on their fleet ponies, leaving us only the thirteen scalps, 150 dead
horses and ponies and a few old blankets and war bonnets as trophies of the fray." 203 Charles
Diehl interviewed a number of Sioux leaders, including Crazy Horse, a year after the battle, and
he reported, "The Indians say in the latter fight [Battle of the Rosebud] 36 Indians were killed and
63 wounded ." 204 This meant a total of 99 warriors were casualties.
These numbers have contributed to a study by Dave Grossman on men' s unwillingness to
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kill in battle. Grossman stated, "General Crook' s men fired 25,000 rounds at Rosebud Creek on
June 17, 1876, causing 99 casualties among the Indians, or 252 rounds per hit. " The author' s
thesis was that the large expenditure of ammunition and the resulting few casualties were caused
neither by the soldiers' nervousness nor their poor marksmanship, but by their innate aversion to
killing a human being.205 If accurate, this argument would explain why the army and Indians
fought so long, expended so much ammunition, and inflicted so few casualties on each other.
The Shoshone boy, who was killed in the battle, was the subject of much mourning among
the members of his tribe. The other Shoshone warriors made noise of "melancholy wailing"
during the night, and they called "upon the Great Spirt" for vengeance. The next morning the boy
was buried in a grave "dug for the body in the bed of the stream." After the corpse was covered
with earth, "a group of warriors on horseback rode over the site several times, thus making it
impossible for the Sioux to find the body." The corpses of the dead soldiers were hidden in a
similar manner. They were "quietly buried within the limits of the camp, and every precaution
was taken to obliterate the traces" of the graves.206
The soldiers dug a deep trench near the bank of the Rosebud creek near the water line.
The bodies of the dead were laid in a row, "covered with stones, mud, and earth packed down,
and a great fire kindled on top and allowed to burn all night. " The next morning when the
soldiers broke camp to march away "the entire command marched over the graves, so as to
obliterate every trace and prevent prowling savages from exhuming the corpses and scalping
them ." 207
This effort to make sure neither the Sioux nor Cheyenne could locate the corpses and
desecrate the bodies of the dead soldiers proved to be futile, because the Indians had no trouble
finding them. The morning after the battle about twenty young Sioux warriors, including
Standing Bear, went to the location of the battle and then to the area where the army had camped.
They noticed a place where the ground was recently dug up and where a large fire had been built.
The young men realized something important had been buried there, and they dug immediately
with their hands. Soon they found a "blanket and there was a dead soldier in it. " They pulled him
out of the ground, and one of the warriors said, "This is my blanket. I have been looking for this
blanket. I will have this blanket." He took it. According to Standing Bear, the bodies were
buried one on top of the other, and the Sioux found more corpses under the first. Standing Bear
got the blanket from the fifth body in the stack . The dead soldier was a young man, and he had a
"ring on his finger with a white stone in it that sparkled." The warrior cut the finger off the
corpse and took the ring. One Sioux took a scalp from a body, but the warriors apparently left
the remaining corpses unmolested .208
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Aftermath and Accusations
The wounded soldiers were treated well, and they were brought away on travois which
allowed them to be transported with as much comfort as possible. Additionally, six men were
assigned to each wounded man to assure that all his needs were met. The retreat from the
Rosebud River was largely uneventful, and Lieutenant Bourke had little to note in his diary other
than the nights were very cold. The morning after the battle, 18 June, was surprisingly cold, and
the soldiers awoke at 3 AM to a hard frost, "which made everyone shiver. " The following
morning was equally cold, "last night was very cold- one of the coldest for a summer night I ever
experienced. Frost covered the ground and our sleep was interrupted by the intense cold." The
army marched back to the encampment at Goose Creek on Tongue river and arrived on 19 June.
The weather remained worthy of comment. While the weather had been very cold for two nights
in a row, the temperature rose to 103 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade on 20 June.209
While General Crook awaited five companies as reinforcements, he and his men relaxed
for weeks. They bathed, rested, and many of them spent time fishing . The soldiers caught many
hundreds if not thousands of trout in the cold streams in the area, and fish became an important
part of the men's diet. Crook was especially pleased to go fishing day after day. Ironically, on 25
June 1876, " Squads of men and officers constantly pass Headquarters en rout to the canyon a
couple of miles above .... Trout are caught there every moment, and some little game of other
kinds is shot. " 2 10
On that exact day, George Armstrong Custer's 7th Cavalry, less than seventy miles away,
was heavily engaged at the Battle of Little Bighorn in which the command was almost annihilated
and about 265 cavalrymen were killed. Custer' s regiment had suffered a severe defeat at the
hands of the same Indians Crook and his men had engaged only eight days before at the Battle of
the Rosebud. It was immediately apparent that the Sioux and Cheyenne had been encouraged by
their victory at the Rosebud and had aggressively engaged the 7th Cavalry a few days later.
Crook' s men were still relaxing and fishing on 10 July, seventeen days after the Battle of the Little
Bighorn, when word arrived in camp of Custer' s disaster. Before then, some of Crook' s men
thought they had won a victory at the Rosebud, but the news of he disaster of the 7th Cavalry
caused many men to change their opinion of the earlier engagement.
The fact that no hostile Indians followed the army either to molest or harass the soldiers
help make Lieutenant Bourke believe that the troopers had won a big victory at the Battle of the
Rosebud . "The absence of hostile demonstrations since our fight of June 17th speaks very plainly
of the severe handling the Sioux received that day. Were they victorious or had the day been even
undecided, our camp would long since have been beleaguered by the sharpshooters." 211 Bourke
did not realize that the Indians had been able to attack the columns converging on them one at a
time. The lack of renewed attacks by the Sioux and Cheyenne on the soldiers demonstrated that
they no longer needed to worry about Crook' s command, and they could concentrate their forces
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elsewhere. Anson Mills presented a better summation of the outcome of the battle. "We then all
realized for the first time that while we were lucky not to have been entirely vanquished, we had
been most humiliatingly defeated ." 212
General Crook had taken his entire army out of the campaign against the Sioux and
Cheyenne by remaining at Goose Creek for weeks. This meant he had failed to follow his orders
and he did not participate in the pincer movement that was supposed to crush the Indians between
columns of cavalry. Crooks failure exposed Custer and his command to the force of enemy
warriors, which contributed to the disaster at the Battle of the Little Bighorn.
A reporter for The Daily Independent newspaper in Helena, Montana, wrote a scathing
report on General Crook. The article was dated 25 June 1876 and was sent from Fort Laramie,
Wyoming, long before the men at the post heard of Custer's defeat. The newspaperman stated
the opinion of many men stationed at the fort . "The officers of the post speak in terms of
unmeasured condemnation of Gen. Crook' s behavior, and denounce his retreat in the face of the
savage enemy as cowardly." The correspondent further stated that the General had lost the
respect of the Crow scouts who had recently served with him. "They call Crook the ' Squaw
Chief and say he' s afraid to fight. " Many of the soldiers at Fort Laramie also believed that the
battle was "humiliating and disgraceful to the last degree." 2 13
Such strong condemnations of Crook' s conduct was probably unfair, and many others
viewed his leadership in the battle more favorably. Many of his superiors, including Generals
William T. Sherman and Phil Sheridan, stated they still had faith in him and even President Grant
agreed, "General Crook is the best, wiliest Indian fighter in the country." 2 14 But these opinions
were clearly biased because the military leaders of the nation, who were making Indian policy,
were unlikely to criticize those where implementing government strategy.
Crook soon came to his own defense by stating erroneously that he had less than a
thousand men in the battle. In reality he had over 1,300 men . He stated that his command was
about the same size as Custer' s 7th Cavalry, and, if he had pursued the enemy, he would have
suffered a similar fate as had Custer' s men. In reality, Crook ' s command had about twice as
many men as the 7th Cavalry. The General further said that he won the engagement by driving the
Indians away, but he decided not to pursue his victory because he had to care for his wounded
men.2 15 Crook' s attempt to distort the truth of the situation by changing the numbers of men in
his and in Custer' s commands demonstrated, at least, that he was a dishonest man if not an
outright liar.
Despite the fact that Crook maintained that he had achieved a victory at the Rosebud, he
still blamed some of his subordinates for not achieving a greater triumph. Ten years after the
battle Crook confronted Colonel Royall and Captain Nickerson for being slow in following
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orders. At that time, the two men defended their actions in the battle. 2 16
One of the means that Crook attempted to defray criticism was to engage in another
aggressive campaign late in the summer. In his attempt to regain his reputation, Crook drove his
men deep into Montana and South Dakota under very trying weather conditions trying to locate
an Indian camp they could attack. Faced with starvation, his men were finally forced to eat their
horses. Luckily for Crook ' s reputation, his command stumbled onto an Indian camp at Slim
Buttes in the night of 9 and 10 Sept. 18 76. They attacked the settlement. The resulting easy
victory against a weak adversary drew attention away from his defeat at the Rosebud .217
No matter how General Crook tried to blame others for the poor leadership at the
Rosebud, distract attention from the loss, or state that a defeat was a victory, he must bear the
greatest responsibility for how the battle was fought. On the morning of the engagement, Crook
failed to reconnoiter the area, and he was easily surprised by his adversaries. He allowed his men
to rest and set their mounts free to graze, meaning that the horses were far away at the moment
when they were badly needed . Crook was distracted by playing cards when the fighting started,
and he was slow to react to the rapidly developing engagement. Only the quick reaction by his
Indian scouts saved the command from heavy losses or a complete route.
During the battle, the General spread his forces over too wide an area to bring proper fire
on the attacking Sioux and Cheyenne, but Crook' s tactics were most advantageous to the enemy
warriors. In attacking on a broad front, he effectively divided his forces into small groups, which
allowed his men to be struck in small detachments, meaning that many men were killed or
wounded needlessly. Crook ' s attempt to attack the Indian village, which was nowhere in the
area, was the height of foolishness. In doing so, he had divided his command in the face of a
superior enemy, which could have been disastrous.
The biggest credit for the success of the Indians in the battle must be given to the Sioux
and Cheyenne themselves. These warriors had rode through much of the night to surprise their
adversaries. They dictated the terms of the battle, and their timely maneuvers kept the soldiers
confused and off balance. The warriors engaged and disengaged the troopers at will, and the
battle only ended when the Indians decided to withdraw . The skill of Crazy Horse and his men
had brought success in the battle. Unfortunately, the Indian victory at the Battle of the Rosebud
was only a temporary accomplishment because the white invaders won the Great Sioux War late
in the fall and in the winter of 1876-7. Within a year of the Battle of the Rosebud, the Indians
were once again living in humiliating circumstances on federal reservations. The Sioux had lost
control of their sacred lands because of the dishonesty and brutality of the U.S . government.
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